West Asia Daily News

133-Reduced US security commitment to the Middle East increases China’s influence

Anthony, 1-13, 23, Benjamin Anthony is Co-Founder & CEO of The MirYam Institute, Can Israel Navigate U.S.-China Competition?, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/can-israel-navigate-us-china-competition-206110

China is rapidly becoming a major player in the Middle East; no longer just in terms of oil imports, but in regional security affairs, as well. Xi’s visit to Saudi Arabia was designed at least partly as a counterbalance to China’s ties with Iran. Chuck emphasizes that one of the reasons for the Gulf countries’ interest in expanded ties with China is their decreasing confidence in the U.S. security commitment to them and the understanding that Israel, especially under the new government, cannot constitute even a substitute for the United States. Danny starts a discussion of the impact of U.S.-Chinese ties on U.S. ties with Israel, including the Phalcon case, one of the worst crises in U.S.-Israeli relations.

132-Can’t solve Israel-Palestine – Netanyahu can’t restrain the hard-liners without going to jail

Miller & Simon, 1-13, 23, Aaron David Miller is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former U.S. State Department Middle East analyst and negotiator in Republican and Democratic administrations. He is the author of The End of Greatness: Why America Can’t Have (and Doesn’t Want) Another Great President; Steven Simon is the Robert E. Wilhelm fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a research analyst at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. His new book, Grand Delusion: The Rise and Fall of American Ambition in the Middle East, will be released in April, Foreign Policy, Biden Is About to Have His Hands Full in the Middle East, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/13/biden-united-states-middle-east-iran-israel/

Yet Biden may soon have his hands full with smaller yet determined regional powers eager to advance their own interests and unwilling to play by U.S. rules. With five states—Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Libya—in various stages of dysfunction, the Arab world will remain a source of instability, with the exception being wealthy Persian Gulf states (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) that are acting with greater independence from Washington while insisting on U.S. support.

But it’s really the two non-Arab powers, Iran and Israel—one, the United States’ foremost regional adversary, the other its closest regional friend—that may set the agenda for the next two years. And the implications of that are not particularly uplifting.

With Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s return to office, the Biden administration now confronts the most extreme right-wing government in Israel’s history, one likely to cause a serious rise in—if not an explosion of—tensions over the Palestinian issue and Iran’s nuclear program. If you believe the rhetoric of its extremist ministers—and there’s no reason not to—this coalition is determined to alter Israel’s democratic system, transform society along Jewish exclusivist lines, sow tensions with Israel’s Arab citizens, and erect a gravestone over the buried hope of a Palestinian state by permanently lashing the majority of the West Bank and Jerusalem to Israel.

How bad the situation in the West Bank becomes may be tied to the degree to which Netanyahu can exercise influence over coalition partners he desperately needs to pass legislation that will postpone, if not nullify, his ongoing trial. Being not as far right as other members of his party, Netanyahu would much prefer a coalition without extremists and may be already thinking about broadening his government at some point. But his legal travails are existential. Without some skyhook, he almost certainly faces prison if convicted—or, more likely, a plea bargain and an exit from politics. He cannot, therefore, jettison the extremists; for the time being, he’ll have to manage them.

Netanyahu will do what he can to smother or divert their most egregious policies, but it’s hard to see how he can completely control them and easy to see how the fiefdoms they’ve carved out in their respective governmental roles could wreak havoc in relations with Israeli Arabs as well as Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem.

Itamar Ben-Gvir, now the newly created minister of national security, ran on a platform of demonizing Palestinian citizens of Israel and will have a great deal of authority over the border police, an additional 2,000 troops he’s taken from the Israel Defense Forces, and Israel’s national police force. He will be free to reset their rules of engagement and permissible tactics, particularly in the mixed cities where Arabs and Jews interact. He will be able to redirect forces from the West Bank to the Negev or Galilee, which will not only endow him with unprecedented coercive power within the Green Line but also in effect erase it by creating a unitary jurisdiction for Israeli law enforcement.

Bezalel Smotrich, perhaps the more dangerous of the two ministers, will have near-total authority for managing the lives of the inhabitants in Area C (more than 60 percent of the West Bank)—some 400,000 Israelis and 280,000 Palestinians—with responsibilities for all authorities related to infrastructure, planning, construction, energy, electricity supply, environmental protection, and more. Smotrich’s strategic goal is to dilute the influence of the Ministry of Defense and work to apply Israeli civilian law to these areas, effectively accelerating annexation.

131-Putting pressure on Israel alienates Republicans

And sooner rather than later, a blow up will become Biden’s problem. Depending on how bad the situation becomes, he’ll likely face action in the United Nations Security Council, forcing him to defend or criticize Israel. And it’s not in Biden’s political interest to be caught between Republicans, who will demand that he supports Israel, and a growing number of progressives within the Democratic Party who want him to criticize Israel’s actions against Palestinians. European allies will press him to restrain Netanyahu, as will the countries of the Abraham Accords. And hovering above it all will be serious unrest and violence.

130-Iran nuclear deal is dead

Prospects for a return to the nuclear accord seem remote at this point; Biden even conceded last month that the deal was dead, though he didn’t want to say it publicly. Iran’s brutal crackdown on unprecedented demonstrations calling for the end of the regime, now in their fourth month, combined with Tehran’s supply of drones to fuel Russia’s war against Ukraine have raised anti-Iranian animus in Washington. Given congressional opposition, it’s arguable whether the administration could even do a deal on the nuclear issue with Iran, as it would involve providing Tehran with sanctions relief at a time that Iran is killing its own citizens and helping Russian President Vladimir Putin kill Ukrainians.

129-The US needs to use diplomacy to push Azerbaijan to open the Lachin corridor

Ghazarian, 1-13, 22, Salpi Ghazarian is director of special projects at the USC Dornsife Institute of Armenian Studies, LA Times, Op-Ed: The cruel blockade against Armenians shows the world order has collapsed, https://sports.yahoo.com/op-ed-cruel-blockade-against-110137776.html

The fighting ended with a ceasefire formally codified by the three political entities: Armenians of the Autonomous Republic of Karabakh, and the leadership of the republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Karabakh connection to Armenia was assured through a corridor of land that Armenians controlled, to offer a lifeline — a link to the outside world — while negotiators worked to reach agreement on Karabakh’s future political status. When I returned to Karabakh a year later, I traveled along that corridor, in an old Soviet truck carrying children’s school supplies that came from France. Since then, the corridor has been open. During the vicious 44-day war in 2020, it was open. Yes, during the fierce Azerbaijani onslaught intended to take complete control of Karabakh and its surrounding regions, which resulted in an estimated 7,000 deaths, the corridor was open. The new ceasefire document stipulated that the future of the corridor requires a negotiated resolution, and until that happens, Russian peacekeepers would ensure access and travelers’ safety. To close it now, as Azerbaijan has done since early December, means strangling the Armenian population to force a desired political outcome. Food, supplies and medical help can’t get in. Energy shortages persist. People cannot travel out. Families remain divided. Armenians are blockaded, and Russians are not keeping the peace. Instead, Russia has made clear to Armenians that their “Western ways” — democracy and an open, free society — are not only undesirable but punishable. Azerbaijan is pursuing control of the territory without its people, who want a continuation of the democracy they have experienced for nearly 30 years. Speaking of Armenians in Karabakh and Azerbaijan’s insistence that they live under its flag, President Aliyev cynically claimed that “just like all the other citizens of Azerbaijan, their rights and security will be provided.” It would be laughable if it weren’t so chilling. Azerbaijan’s dictator is unaccountable to his people, and his country has a track record of repressing its own citizens. It is only the pressure or sanctions of the international community that has a chance of changing Azerbaijan’s actions. The United States and the European Union, along with members of the U.N. Security Council, have called on Baku to restore traffic on the corridor and open the route to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. They need to do more. The letter from Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass and L.A. City Council President Paul Krekorian is a welcome move urging President Biden to take further steps to open air and land links immediately. Armenians are now standing as a bastion of freedom in a volatile neighborhood. They are paying for it with a winter blockade, completely isolated and defenseless. It is clear that the Russian war on Ukraine has upended all international rules. There seems to be no global order left. Sovereignty — which is always fragile — has lost its meaning. Will the new world order be designed by autocrats for whom ethnic cleansing in broad daylight is a political tool? What is allowed to happen to the Armenians of Karabakh will be an indication of what kind of world awaits us all.

128-Reduced US security commitment to the Middle East increases China’s influence

127-Sustaining Arab-Palestinian truce critical to prevent an explosion of violence

Dangot, 1-13, 23, Major General Eitan Dangot is a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. He concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014, Will Temple Mount Tensions Spark Another Arab-Israeli Crisis?, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/will-temple-mount-tensions-spark-another-arab-israeli-crisis-206114

Events surrounding the Temple Mount can pour fuel on the fire of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and ignite an inferno, literally, within hours. On the Israeli-Jewish side, the issue also serves as a detonator for extremist radical elements, who preach incessantly for the establishment of a Jewish foothold on the Temple Mount and wish to fly a red flag in front of the bull. Activities of this nature can upend Israeli government policies and the State of Israel’s ability to maintain law and order in Jerusalem. In Benjamin Netanyahu’s new cabinet, several parties have full-fledged right-wing lawmakers coming to power for the first time. The Temple Mount is part of the political hardcore environment that they grew up in. National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir’s ascension to the Temple Mount on January 3 has far-reaching implications as it threatens the delicate security balance in Jerusalem, in the territories controlled by the Palestinian Authority, and in Gaza. His decision to ascend the Temple Mount in one of his first acts as a minister was a deliberate provocation against Arab citizens of the State of Israel, Palestinians, and the Arab states of the region. It is clear that from now on, every move and every statement made by Ben Gvir and some of his colleagues will come under scrutiny and in the near future will trigger a response, perhaps in words but also possibly in actions. Before ascending to the Temple Mount, Ben Gvir should have adopted the maxim, “think first, act later.” Still, it is important to clarify that the status quo on the Temple Mount has not changed, and there is no plan to change it. Netanyahu had the option—one that he has adopted in the past—to instruct his ministers to refrain from visiting the Temple Mount and allow only rank-and-file ministers of the Knesset to do so. So far, he has yet to implement such a policy this time around. At the same time, Hamas has good reasons to avoid going to war over this issue. The current situation (where Gaza is quiet, but the West Bank is witnessing an increase in terrorist attacks and clashes between Palestinians and Israeli forces), together with the declining status of the Palestinian Authority, serves Hamas’s strategy well. This has been the case since May 2021 when Hamas initiated a conflict with Israel to portray itself as the protector of Al Aqsa. Hamas is currently hard at work rehabilitating its military force in Gaza, while at the same time exploiting opportunities to improve the strip’s economy and alleviate some of the pressure on it. Israel has granted some 20,000 work visas for Gazans, who bring much-needed cash into the Gazan economy. Meanwhile, Hamas is strengthening its collaboration with Hezbollah, Iran, and regional terror elements to optimize its position on the day the ceasefire is called off. In the near future, the Islamic holiday of Ramadan, which begins on March 26, could have game-changing potential in the conflict between the Palestinians and Israel. And the Temple Mount’s role could be critical here. The month preceding Ramadan is historically associated with an increase in hatred and religious agitation. This is when it will be easiest to spark an explosion among Palestinians and Arab Israelis on the streets of East Jerusalem and in Israel. Israel’s strategy, particularly that of this new government, must be aimed at preventing this scenario wherever possible.

126-40% of Gazans are food insecure

Middle East Monitor, 1-13, 22, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230113-unrwa-over-40-of-gazans-are-severely-food-insecure/, UNRWA: Over 40% of Gazans are severely food insecure

“Over 40 per cent of Gazans are now severely food insecure, which means that they are regularly going a day without food,” UNRWA affirmed in a new report on Wednesday, The Palestinian Information Centre reports. “After 16 years of a land, air and sea blockade, life in Gaza has become increasingly dire,” UNRWA said. “The situation has been compounded by repeated cycles of hostilities, heightened tensions and violence, political instability and the COVID-19 pandemic. Together, these factors have destabilised the lives of individuals and communities and have further increased the hardships they are facing. Gaza is on ‘life support’ with 80 per cent of the population dependent on humanitarian assistance,” the UN refugee agency underscored. “Currently, three out of four Gazans rely on emergency food assistance – and, despite this support, the rate of food insecurity is rising. With exceptionally high poverty and unemployment rates, an already fragile humanitarian situation threatens to deteriorate further,” it added.

125-Israel constantly violating Lebanon’s air space

Middle East News, 1-13, 23, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230113-lebanon-fails-to-intercept-israel-drone/, Lebanon fails to intercept Israel drone

The Lebanese army announced today it had failed to intercept an Israeli drone flown over Lebanon’s southern airspace, a statement revealed. It added that a patrol was inspecting a separate incident in the south when a “drone belonging to the Israeli enemy violated Lebanese airspace,” prompting soldiers to shoot in its direction. A Lebanese security source told Reuters they failed to shoot it down. It comes after the Lebanese army said earlier this week that an Israeli drone and gunboat violated the Lebanese air space and maritime border, Anadolu News Agency reports. An Israeli army drone violated the Lebanese airspace “from opposite the town of Ramyah towards the town of Marwahin for 20 minutes,” the Lebanese Army said in a Monday’s statement. Lebanon says Israel violates its airspace and territorial waters on an almost daily basis and had called on the UN to intervene to stop these violations, especially with regard to the Israeli bombing of Syria from Lebanese airspace.

124-Blockade of Nagorno-Barabakh is genocide

Sarkissian, 1-12, 23, Dr. Armen Sarkissian, a scientist and former diplomat, served as the fifth prime minister and the fourth president of the Republic of Armenia. His next book, The Small States Club: How Small Smart States Can Save the World, will be published in November 2023, https://time.com/6246850/armenia-azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh-lachin-corridor/

For the past five weeks, the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, sandwiched between Azerbaijan and Armenia, has been blockaded by Azerbaijan. As much of the world celebrated Christmas and New Year, over 120,000 Armenian residents of the region—the oldest continuously inhabited Armenian homeland, dotted with Armenian churches and monasteries and monuments predating the spread of Christianity to Europe by decades—were cut off from the world. A group of Azerbaijani citizens identifying as “environmental activists” barricaded the Lachin corridor, a mountainous road that serves as the only path between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, since December 12. The flow of food and medicine fell to a trickle before the supplies essential for the continuation of normal life gradually disappeared altogether. A place that once received 400 tons of food and medical supplies daily now barely receives a few carloads on a good day. Hospitals have indefinitely put surgeries on hold. Children are going hungry. There is an acute shortage of fuel as temperatures drop to below -4°C, and families are burning scraps to heat their homes. Armenians, a people who endured a protracted genocide under the Ottoman Empire before being exposed to Soviet autocratic rule in the 20th century, are being subjected to collective punishment in the 21st century with the intent of driving them out of their home. Nagorno-Karabakh, a historically Armenian territory, is known to Armenians as Artsakh. Despite its history and demography, it was handed to Soviet Azerbaijan in 1921 by Joseph Stalin, who implemented the imperial method of disrupting cohesive national and ethnic communities to keep diverse populations in check. In 1988, the people of Artsakh voted overwhelmingly in a referendum to dissolve Moscow’s artificial cartography, secede from Soviet Azerbaijan and assert their Armenian identity. This defiant act of self-determination resulted in yet more massacres of Armenians, whose wish was not honored. Upon the USSR’s collapse, Artsakh ended up inside the Soviet frontiers inherited by Azerbaijan. The Armenians, however, defeated Azerbaijan in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, which lasted until 1994, when the region proclaimed its autonomy. Then, in 2020, at the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Azerbaijan launched a surprise offensive—now known as the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War—with the open involvement and assistance of Turkey. Azerbaijan wanted the land—without the people who inhabit the land. Its battlefield gains were followed by a ruthless effort to raze all traces of Armenian history. While Armenia maintains a medieval mosque in its capital, has excellent relations with the Islamic world and welcomes people of all faiths, Azerbaijan has taken to disfiguring and destroying Armenian churches in the territory it took as a matter of policy. Hundreds of Armenian servicemen still remain in Azeri captivity The humanitarian catastrophe we are now witnessing—or, more accurately, the world is refusing to witness—is a textbook enactment of ethnic cleansing. More than a dozen nongovernmental organisations, including Genocide Watch, have issued a stark warning that Azerbaijan’s blockade is “designed to, in the words of the Genocide Convention, deliberately inflict conditions of life calculated to bring about the end of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group in whole or in part. All 14 risk factors for atrocity crimes identified by the UN Secretary-General’s Office on Genocide Prevention are now present.”

123-Syrian refugees in Turkey returning home now

IANS, 1-11, 23, https://in.investing.com/news/turkey-russia-syria-dialogue-to-facilitate-refugees-return-erdogan-3480490, Turkey, Russia, Syria dialogue to facilitate refugees’ return: Erdogan

The number of Syrian refugees returning to their homeland will increase as a result of new dialogues among Turkey, Russia and Syria, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said. As the security situation in northern Syria improves, the number of Syrians returning to their homes will increase, the Turkish President told the International Ombudsman Conference on Wednesday. Turkey hosts more than four million refugees, including 3.5 million Syrians who fled from their war-torn country, according to Erdogan. Nearly 550,000 Syrian refugees have returned to northern Syria where Turkey “has cleared of terrorism and made secure,” the Turkish President added. “The number will increase as the diplomatic contacts among Turkey, Russia and Syria bear fruit. We will continue to fulfill our duties of brotherhood, neighbourliness, and humanity,” he said. Syrian, Turkish, and Russian Defence Ministers, along with Intelligence Chiefs from the three countries, met in Moscow on December 28, marking the first high-level contact between Ankara and Damascus since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Xinhua news agency reported. Last week, Erdogan said he might meet his Syrian counterpart Bashar al-Assad to foster peace and stability in the region. The two leaders have not met since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, as Turkey has backed Syrian rebels politically and militarily during the 11-year crisis.

122-US should increase diplomacy with Saudi Arabia in order to prevent it from building ties with China

Wabha & Zobak, 1-11, 23, Mariam Wahba is an Egyptian-American Middle East analyst. She is an Associate Director of Advocacy with the Philos Project and the co-host of the Americanish podcast; Zane Zovak foreign policy analyst who writes about the U.S.-China rivalry. His work has been featured in publications such as Foreign Policy, The Diplomat, The National Interest, and Defense One, Saudi Arabia Remains an Indispensable U.S. Ally, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/saudi-arabia-remains-indispensable-us-ally-206100

The momentum continued when Xi touched down in Riyadh. During Xi’s visit, he and MBS signed a strategic partnership between their respective nations, as well as facilitated a number of private sector deals between Saudi and Chinese companies in fields including information technology, genetics, mining, hydrogen energy, and manufacturing totaling more than $29 billion. Notably, Huawei signed a memorandum of understanding with a Saudi government ministry that enables the telecom conglomerate to build partnerships with local data centers. The two also agreed to make this a more regular dialogue, as they continue to find tangible ways to deepen their relationship where their interests align. For the Saudis, those interests include gaining access to massive investment from the world’s second-largest economy. The Saudis may also see ties with Beijing as a hedge against their biggest regional threat, Iran—the thought being that Iranian reliance on China might be a lever by which to moderate Tehran’s malign behavior in the region. Moves closer to China increased when the Biden administration announced its intention to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a deal the kingdom has vehemently opposed. American promises and declarations about “longer and stronger” during negotiations did little to assuage Saudi concerns. But mass protests in Iran and the regime’s response have seemingly changed the calculus for the Biden administration, leading it to announce, perhaps unintentionally, that the Iran deal is dead. While this could ease some tension between Washington and Riyadh, America should officially commit to this position, both to dispel the fiction that such a return is feasible and to reassure our partners in the region. More broadly, in order to salvage America’s fragile position in the Middle East, the White House needs to invite a Saudi delegation to Washington to outline why Saudi interests are better served when Riyadh partners with the United States over China, while also being frank about why it matters to America. First, the administration should reassure the KSA that the United States is better equipped and more likely to contain Iran. This starts with accepting that the window of opportunity for a nuclear deal has passed. Since JCPOA negotiations began, the KSA and others in the region have viewed Washington’s concessions as a sign of weakness, proof the United States was abandoning its allies. In order to counter this narrative, the United States should denounce Iran’s shifting demands and publicly call the time of death on the JCPOA. Second, the United States should increase its Foreign Military Sales to the KSA. This would help arm them with cutting-edge products against Iran and the proxies it employs to destabilize the region. Iranian proxies also target longtime American ally, Israel, and that dynamic is unlikely to improve with a greater Chinese presence. When Xi met with Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas during his recent trip, he reiterated that China “always stands with the Palestinian people.” Third, Washington should work with corporate America to provide investment alternatives to Chinese products. Not only would closer economic ties advance American commercial interests, but they would also help ensure the KSA doesn’t become technologically dependent on China. Recent telecom deals may seem innocuous but Huawei and other Chinese companies have been banned from the United States and elsewhere due to their affiliation with the CCP and involvement in skirting sanctions and in enabling minority repression. Before the KSA goes all in on China, the United States should present alternatives to these blacklisted businesses. Saudi Arabia has long been a leader in the Arab world and will likely continue to do so for years to come. To retain this strategic relationship, the United States needs to make it clear that its shared interests have not shifted. With China and Xi Jinping attempting to disrupt over seven decades of mutual understanding, the onus is on Washington to reassert its position as the indispensable ally.

121-The US needs to push Turkey to allow Sweden and Finland to join NATO

Andrew Rettman, 1-10, 23, EU Observor, No sign of quick Nato deal, as Turkey and Sweden dig in, https://euobserver.com/nordics/156588

Turkey and Sweden have hit a wall in talks on Nato accession, with some predicting Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won’t give way till July. The deadlock comes after Sweden indicated it won’t extradite anybody else to Turkey just to please Ankara. “We have done what we said we would do, but they [Turkey] also say that they want things that we cannot or do not want to give them,” Swedish prime minister Ulf Kristersson said on Sunday (8 January). “We have complied with all parts of the agreement with Turkey and Finland, and we continue to implement them,” the Swedish foreign ministry also told EUobserver on Tuesday, referring to a pact on Nato enlargement between Ankara, Helsinki, and Stockholm. “It is up to Turkey to decide when ratification will take place. We cannot speculate on a specific date,” Sweden said. “I think, now they [Sweden] lost their patience and want to make the Erdoğan regime understand that they demand the impossible,” added Bülent Keneş, an exiled Turkish journalist in Stockholm. Sweden and Finland are ending decades of neutrality by joining Nato in reaction to Russia’s war in Europe, but Erdoğan has demanded Sweden hand over Keneş and 42 others in return for ratification. Swedish courts extradited two people but ruled Keneş can keep his asylum, before Sweden now claimed it has “complied with all parts” of Turkey’s request. Turkey had made similar demands of Finland, who extradited nobody. “Finland has constructively implemented the trilateral memorandum agreed in Madrid last year,” the Finnish foreign ministry also told EUobserver on Tuesday, when asked if there was anything left to do. The three capitals are meant to iron out their differences in a trilateral “contact group”. But this last met on 25 November and there is no date set for its first meeting this year. For his part, Finnish president Sauli Niinistö warned in a speech on 1 January: “It is possible that the delay will extend beyond the [Finnish] parliamentary elections this spring [April]”. Some EU diplomats fear the real deadline is the Turkish election in June. “Erdoğan needs a row to show voters he’s a strong man,” an EU contact said. “Two rich, Western countries seeking his accord, doing his homework, filing reports to him — it’s just too politically delicious,” he added. But one Turkey expert predicted Erdoğan will orchestrate the climax of his “drama” to coincide with the Nato summit in Vilnius in July. “Between the Turkish elections and the Nato summit will be the big moment for a breakthrough,” Asli Aydıntaşbaş, from the Brookings Institution, a think-tank in Washington, said. “It’s a question of his [Erdoğan’s] personality — he’s an insatiable negotiator and he sensed that the Swedes were willing to do anything, so his list kept getting longer”, she added. And ultimately, Keneş and Aydıntaşbaş added, Nato’s major powers will have to lean in to clinch a deal, in a final belittling of the Nordic sates. “In the end, the Americans will have to come into the room and push … it’ll take US intervention,” Aydıntaşbaş said. “If the US, the UK, France, and Germany among others put their weight on the issue they could easily solve the deadlock,” Keneş said. Nato speaks Nato and EU top officials already applied gentle pressure in remarks in Brussels on Tuesday. “Finland and Sweden agreed to lift restrictions on arms exports [to Turkey], that has already been done. And they also agreed to work more closely in the fight against terrorism, that is also taking place,” Nato secretary general Jens Stoltenberg said. He underlined that both were covered by Nato’s Article 5 mutual-defence clause in de facto terms while awaiting ratification. “It’s inconceivable that Finland and Sweden will face any military threats without Nato reacting to that,” he said.

120-Sustaining Arab-Palestinian truce critical to prevent an explosion of violence

Dangot, 1-13, 23, Major General Eitan Dangot is a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. He concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014, Will Temple Mount Tensions Spark Another Arab-Israeli Crisis?, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/will-temple-mount-tensions-spark-another-arab-israeli-crisis-206114

119-The US doesn’t need cobalt from West Asia

Bazilian & Brew, 1-6, 23, MORGAN D. BAZILIAN is the Director of the Payne Institute for Public Policy and Professor of at the Colorado School of Mines; GREGORY BREW is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Jackson School of Global Affairs at Yale University, Foreign Affairs, The Missing Minerals; To Shift to Clean Energy, America Must Rethink Supply Chains, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/missing-minerals-clean-energy-supply-chains

Shifting to a clean energy economy will require a decades-long investment in technologies such as solar, wind, geothermal, nuclear, and batteries. All this infrastructure will require massive quantities of critical minerals. According to the International Energy Agency, the world will require four times more critical minerals in 2040 than are currently mined, from roughly seven million tons to 28 million tons. By that point, energy transition needs will consume 40 percent of the world’s copper production, 60 to 70 percent of its nickel and cobalt production, and almost 90 percent of its lithium production. For lithium, demand is expected to be 13 times greater in 2040 than it was in 2020. Over the last 5,000 years, the human race has mined 700 million tons of copper. That is roughly as much as will be needed over the next 22 years to meet global energy transition targets.

This level of supply production does not yet exist. New mines will have to be dug, and processing and refining industrial complexes will need to be built—both exceedingly difficult to do with existing permitting rules. The existing facilities, moreover, are almost entirely outside the United States. The production of critical minerals is concentrated in a handful of countries. Indonesia makes 30 percent of the world’s nickel, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo supplies 70 percent of the world’s cobalt….

The Biden administration is already taking steps in this direction: in December, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken signed memorandums of understanding with officials from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia, two major cobalt producers, demonstrating the United States’ desire to import greater amounts of cobalt and other minerals for EV battery manufacturing. The United States should work through the Mineral Security Partnership—a new pact that comprises Australia, Canada, France, and the United States—to fund overseas mining operations through the Export-Import Bank.

118-Collapse of the deal is actually better for deterrence, which stops war, but we need diplomacy to effectuate it

Geoffrey Aronson is a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC., 1-5, 23, The United States and Iran Are Headed Toward a New Nuclear Normal, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/united-states-and-iran-are-headed-toward-new-nuclear-normal-206076

Iran always saw this as an unequal and coercive bargain, which masked a continuing effort by Washington to undermine the Iranian revolution of 1979. Washington, for its part, proved unwilling, even in the wake of the 2015 agreement, to forego the use of ever-escalating economic sanctions at the heart of its policy of “maximum pressure” towards Tehran. The Trump administration’s repudiation of the agreement precipitated the complete breakdown of this enterprise, which the Biden administration has failed to remedy. But there is reason to believe that the JCPOA’s failure has created an opportunity to build a post-JCPOA understanding between Washington and Tehran that may indeed prove more lasting and effective than the moribund JCPOA in defusing Washington’s (if not Israel’s) concerns. The keystone of this new phase of U.S.-Iranian nuclear diplomacy is a mutual embrace of the concept of nuclear ambiguity. This cautious development in U.S.-Iran relations rests on a mutual Iranian and American interest to maintain and honor a studied uncertainty concerning Iran’s nuclear weapons capability. This posture stands in direct opposition to the were the key objectives at the heart of the JCPOA: to preempt, prevent, and aggressively monitor the expansion of an Iranian nuclear enrichment capability. The doctrine of nuclear ambiguity has a central place in nuclear diplomacy. U.S. and Russian doctrine are based on an openly declared nuclear capability, backed by the promise and the opposing arsenals of mutual nuclear destruction. North Korea maintains a declared nuclear arsenal and delivery system aimed at deterring foreign intervention and maintaining the regime in power. Nuclear ambiguity, in contrast, as practiced by Israel and now increasingly by Iran, all but ignores the issue of uranium enrichment that was at the center of the JCPOA era. It focuses instead on the deliberate decision not to declare the existence of a nuclear weapons capability, either as a deterrent or as a weapon. A policy of deliberate uncertainty about Iran’s nuclear weapons capabilities helps to diffuse unwelcome pressure by the international community to disarm. In contrast, integrating nuclear weapons openly in its military doctrine could well instigate rather than deter armed conflict. The parameters of this new grand bargain between Tehran and Washington first appeared last summer. Not surprisingly, its key elements were announced in the context of U.S. commitments to Israel. The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, announced on July 14, 2022, reaffirms the longstanding “unshakeable U.S. commitment to Israel’s security, and especially to the maintenance of its qualitative military edge (QME).” As long as Washington maintains Israel’s conventional superiority over Iran and its neighbors, Jerusalem will keep its famed nuclear arsenal “in the basement”—that is, ambiguous, undeclared, and undeployed. Nothing new here. But the declaration, taking note of the new post-JCPOA policy on Iran unveils an unusually explicit and perhaps unprecedented public U.S. commitment, “to use all elements of its national power” to ensure that “Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. It is instructive to pay close attention to the extraordinary language now employed by the Biden administration to describe this U.S. policy. The U.S.-Israel agreement, subsequently repeated by administration officials in various venues, does not warn Iran against enriching uranium but rather advises it of certain unprecedented peril (employing “all elements of [U.S.] national power”) should it choose to acquire a nuclear bomb. The distinction is significant, all but inviting Iran to adopt a policy of nuclear ambiguity short of acquisition and deployment as a way of avoiding a preventative or preemptive U.S. (nuclear) attack. Iran appears to have internalized the new line declared by Washington. In the wake of the U.S. announcement, Kamal Kharazi, the head of Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations and a top aide to Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei, acknowledged that Iran indeed has the ability to produce a nuclear weapon, but it is choosing not to do so—the formula at the heart of a policy of nuclear ambiguity. Kharazi told Al Jazeera’s Arabic channel that “In a few days we were able to enrich uranium up to 60% and we can easily produce 90% enriched uranium … Iran has the technical means to produce a nuclear bomb but there has been no decision by Iran to build one.” According to a statement by Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, “The window for reaching an agreement on the part of the Islamic Republic of Iran will not always be open.” He continued: “If the Westerners want to continue their hypocritical and interventionist behavior, we will move in the direction of another plan.” That other plan—Macron’s “new framework”—could well be one based upon nuclear ambiguity. The new nuclear era now emerging in Washington and Tehran (if not necessarily Israel) repudiates two concepts at the heart of the moribund JCPOA. Ambiguity rather than clarity, intentions rather than capabilities, are at the heart of an era of strategic stability now tentatively on offer by Washington and Tehran. Yet unlike the blossoming of Washington’s relations with Israel that followed their nuclear understandings in the late 1960s, relations between Iran and Washington in the wake of this emerging nuclear rapprochement are set to remain in the deep freeze.

117-Israel is willing to make a deal with Saudi Arabia to contain Iran

Hadar, 1-4, 23, Leon Hadar, a Washington-based journalist and global affairs analyst, is the author of Sandstorm: Policy Failure in the Middle East (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)., Saudi Arabia May Be Netanyahu’s Political Lifeline, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/saudi-arabia-may-be-netanyahu%E2%80%99s-political-lifeline-206077

Recognizing that President Joe Biden and his aides will not give him a green light to attack Iran’s nuclear sites, and may even try to revive the nuclear deal with Iran, Netanyahu believes that the only way to change the status quo and force the Americans and the West to confront the Islamic Republic before it is too late is to form a diplomatic and military front with Saudi Arabia and its Arab-Sunni allies. According to press reports, Netanyahu has met in the past with Saudi crown prince and prime minister Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and discussed the potential for cooperation between the Saudis and the Israeli in containing the shared Iranian threat. The hope in Jerusalem has been that in addition to facilitating trade and investment, the so-called Abraham Accords will become the first step in the process of creating a rapid response force modeled after NATO and consisting of Israel and the Gulf states, or perhaps an arrangement like the Asian Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, that would involve cooperation under U.S. leadership. But since the signing of the Abraham Accords, the world has changed in a way that has forced both the Israelis and the Saudis to consider the new international reality, in which growing U.S. military commitments in Europe and Asia are reducing the U.S. ability to sustain its long-term presence in the Middle East. These developments are making it unlikely that Washington would be ready to go to war against Iran if it decides to build a nuclear bomb. At the same time, the growing tensions between MBS and Biden over the Saudi refusal to pump more oil to reduce global energy prices amid the fallout from the Russo-Ukrainian War and Western sanctions have put Riyadh in a very difficult situation. The Saudis are trying to balance their economic interests, which run contrary to those of the United States, with their continued reliance on U.S. military support. Moreover, the Saudis are facing growing hostility in Washington from members of the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, who, in response to Saudi human rights violations, are calling for a reexamination of the U.S. partnership with the Saudis. As it happens, they are also urging a reassessment of the American “special relationship” with Israel. MBS and Bibi, both close buddies of Trump, likely recognize that a Trump restoration in 2024 isn’t going to happen and that, at a minimum, they will have to find ways to work with the Democrats in Washington. From that perspective, Israel and Saudi Arabia share an interest in ensuring that the United States remains militarily engaged in the Middle East. But at the same time, they also have to prepare for the eventuality that the Americans will start reducing their military commitments in the region and create a strategic vacuum, requiring the Israelis and the Arab Gulf states to maintain a common military front to deter Iran. The conventional wisdom is that MBS will refrain from establishing a full diplomatic relationship with Israel as long as his father, King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, an Arab nationalist and a long-time supporter of the Palestinian cause, remains alive. But it’s possible that in the face of the changing global and regional balance of power, MBS will be more inclined to take steps toward a diplomatic détente with Israel, which could help him restore his bruised reputation in Washington. Moreover, the image of MBS and Netanyahu signing a peace accord at the White House would be regarded as a major diplomatic triumph for Biden and reduce the odds that the Americans will revive the nuclear deal with Iran. A peace deal with Saudi Arabia would certainly amount to a political victory for Netanyahu, shifting attention from his controversial cabinet members and his unstable coalition that may not survive longer than a year. It’s doubtful, however, that MBS would agree to make a deal with Netanyahu without some concessions on the Palestinian issue, such as re-committing Israel to the two-state solution and leaving the status of the holy sites in Jerusalem open for negotiations. But that could actually prove to be a good political move for Bibi. By making concessions to the Arabs, he would leave Ben Gvir and Smotrich no choice but to resign from the cabinet and open the door for Gantz and Lapid to join it to ensure that the Knesset approves the peace agreement with the Saudis and can form a national unity government to confront the expected challenges from Iran. A Saudi prince may therefore hold the key to Bibi’s political survival and that of his government, demonstrating how the Middle East is rapidly changing.

116-China-Saudi ties don’t undermine Iran containment

Alaqrout & Ahmadi, 1-3, 23, Ahmed Alqarout is a London-based expert in international political economy. His research focuses on the impact of financial and economic policies on global and regional stability with a special focus on the Middle East and Africa; Ali Ahmadi is a scholar of sanctions and geoeconomics. He is currently an Executive Fellow at the Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP) and a Research Fellow at the Brussels-based Vocal Europe foreign policy think tank. You can follow him on Twitter and Linkedin, Don’t Fear Saudi Arabia’s Pivot to China, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/don%E2%80%99t-fear-saudi-arabia%E2%80%99s-pivot-china-206073?page=0%2C1

Chinese president Xi Jinping’s recent trip to meet with the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) set off a storm of anxiety in Washington. But it’s important to note that much of what was agreed to in these meetings is actually designed to marginalize Iran in regional and trans-regional affairs—a cause shared by the United States and many of its GCC partners.

The Saudi Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement with China comes just two years after Beijing signed a similar deal with Iran. The timing of the deals is thus not a coincidence but a calculable act by Saudi Arabia to contain Iran and curtail any gains it may have secured through such a strategic partnership. Hence, despite popular belief to the contrary, the United States stands to gain from the agreement, which will help ensure Iran’s regional and global power remains checked.

Iran and Saudi Arabia Look East

The Saudi-China strategic partnership should not be seen in isolation from the other agreements Riyadh has advanced in Asia. In a way, Saudi Arabia’s “Pivot to Asia” is its answer to Iran’s “Look to the East” strategy. Iran’s strategy was adopted by conservatives who see Asia and Eurasia as key avenues to expand Iranian influence at the expense of ties with the West. Thus, Saudi Arabia aims to contain Iran’s strides in Asia, supplementing similar U.S. efforts. Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries have been signing deals with Asian countries that Iran seeks stronger ties with to relieve itself from Western economic pressure. In the past two years, Riyadh has signed economic, diplomatic, and defense agreements with Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Kazakhstan, and Bangladesh, to mention a few. Therefore, Saudi Arabia’s closer ties with China should be seen as part of its efforts to contain Iran’s growing relationships in Asia and as a response to the Raisi administration’s shift away from the West.

By signing the China-Saudi Arabia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement, Saudi Arabia has cemented its economic partnership with China, which was already thriving, in a bid to limit the possibility of China moving closer to Iran. According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity, the trade volume between China and Saudi Arabia stood at $65 billion in 2020. The volume of trade in the same year between Iran and China lagged behind at $14.5 billion. The significant gap is partly explained by Western sanctions constraining Chinese companies’ ability to trade with Iran and vice versa. Nonetheless, the signing of the China-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2020 had the potential to boost the volume of trade between the pair.

Furthermore, as the West threatens to sanction China and imposes broad sanctions on Russia, Riyadh is worried that a sanctioned China will seek to boost trade with Iran, as they both aim to resist Western economic statecraft. This was the case with Russia. Since the imposition of sanctions on Russia, Iran has sought to capitalize on the situation, signing large trade deals with Russia that have significantly boosted the volume of trade between the pair, which stood at only $4 billion as of 2021. For example, Iran signed $40 billion worth of gas deals with Russia’s Gazprom. There has also been a significant influx of Russian businesspeople and private sector interest in Iran over the past month and a greater emphasis on major joint infrastructure programs. Thus, Saudi Arabia worries that Iran’s trade with China will grow and tilt the balance in favor of Iran. The Saudi strategic partnership with China ensures that trade between Iran and China remains well below its own, maintaining the balance of power against Iran.

These efforts should also be seen as part of Riyadh’s desire to contain Iran’s championing of emerging non-Western-dominated international organizations. Iran is being elevated to full membership in the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and has applied to join the BRICS bloc led by Russia. Saudi Arabia worries that Iran’s growing importance in such alternative trade and security blocs will offer Iran relief from Western sanctions and enable it to continue pursuing regional activities that undermine Saudi interests. Saudi Arabia applied to join BRICS shortly after Iran filed its membership application and is considering joining the SCO along with Qatar and Bahrain. Furthermore, Riyadh’s commitment to connecting its Vision 2030 with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is also part of its effort to decrease Iran’s chances of being a key beneficiary of the BRI and ensure that China continues to hedge its BRI investments. The Saudi government is also seeking to make Chinese companies base their regional headquarters in the kingdom as part of its steps to ensure its economy dominates the Middle East. This will ensure that Chinese companies approach Iran as a second-priority market, not a strategic one, helping to undermine Iran’s effort to become a regional investment and trade hub for China and others.

On the geo-financial front, Iran and China have been pursuing the de-dollarization of trade and advancing the idea of the “petro-yuan.” By joining the SCO, a key international platform pushing for global de-dollarization, Iran can be a key regional power promoting that agenda. Not only would this help Tehran overcome Western sanctions, but it could also make it the most experienced and capable country in the region with the infrastructure to enable trade in non-dollar currencies. Thus, it is no coincidence that China called Saudi Arabia to join this effort and sell its oil in yuan. While Riyadh remains committed to selling energy exclusively in dollars, the China-Saudi partnership summit makes the “petro-yuan” an official objective, giving Saudi Arabia the ability to exercise that option in the future, especially if Iran advances de-dollarization as a result of its partnership with China. Largescale sales of petroleum through yuan-based contracts may not be possible in the immediate future, but the prospect of such a move would be worrying to Washington due to the importance of dollar-centered energy markets to the dollar’s status as the world’s dominant currency.

The Saudis are also eager to contain Iran’s technological advancement and growing military edge. The Iranian industrial base is perceived by Saudi Arabia as a threat that helps Iran export missiles, drones, and advanced communication technologies in the region, undermining Saudi interests. By warming up to China, Saudi Arabia is seeking to capitalize on China’s industrial capacity to build an advanced industrial base. Thus, China welcomed Saudi sovereign wealth fund investments in its industrial sector, which will help Riyadh gain knowledge to advance its industrial base and maintain the industrial balance with Iran. An agreement to build a drone factory in Saudi Arabia, while signed before the strategic partnership, complements Riyadh’s efforts to ensure the balance of power between Saudi Arabia and Iran remains checked. Of course, Saudi Arabia has access to Western arms that Iran lacks, but it is seeking to develop its indigenous military-industrial capacity.

115-Renewable energy undermines Iran’s oil economy and its renewable sectors

The agreement’s commitment to renewable investment is key to Saudi efforts to contain Iran’s rise. Iran has pursued growth in its renewables industry in a bid to diversify its economy, strengthen its technological capacity, and secure new regional and international partnerships, including with China, which will help it overcome sanctions. GCC countries have been helping Yemen, Iraq, and Syria reduce their reliance on Iranian hydrocarbons by encouraging the use of renewables through initiatives and investments. With the signing of the deal with China, Saudi Arabia aims to gain an edge in the renewables sector, which will undercut Iranian energy sales in the region and beyond. China, as a leading power in renewables, stands to help Saudi Arabia achieve such objectives at the cost of Iran’s aspirations, which are already held back by Western sanctions.

114-New Syria-Turkey ties, no risk of a Turkish invasion

Bhadrakumar, 1-3, 23, MK Bhadrakumar is a former diplomat. He was India’s ambassador to Uzbekistan and Turkey., Russia consolidates in East Mediterranean

It is against such a backdrop that the two meetings in Moscow on Wednesday between the defense ministers and intelligence chiefs of Turkey and Syria in the presence of their Russian counterparts took place. Erdogan’s reconciliation process with Assad is quintessentially his sweet revenge for the American betrayal. Erdogan sought help from Russia, the archetypal enemy country in the US and NATO’s sights, in order to communicate with Assad who is a pariah in American eyes. The matrix is self-evident. On Thursday, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar said: “At the meeting (in Moscow), we discussed what we could do to improve the situation in Syria and the region as soon as possible while ensuring peace, tranquility and stability… We reiterated our respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty rights of all our neighbors, especially Syria and Iraq, and that our sole aim is the fight against terrorism, we have no other purpose.” Russian President Vladimir Putin has been counseling Erdogan in recent years that Turkey’s security concerns are best tackled in coordination with Damascus and that Adana Agreement could provide a framework of cooperation. The Turkish Defense Ministry readout said the meeting in Moscow took place in a “constructive atmosphere” and it was agreed to continue the format of trilateral meetings “to ensure and maintain stability in Syria and the region as a whole.” Without doubt, the normalization between Ankara and Damascus will impact regional security and, in particular, the Syrian war, given the clout Turkey wields with the residual Syrian opposition. A Turkish ground operation in northern Syria may not be necessary if Ankara and Damascus were to revive the Adana Agreement. In fact, Akar disclosed that Ankara, Moscow and Damascus are working on carrying out joint missions on the ground in Syria. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s willingness right in the middle of the Ukraine war to take the steering wheel and navigate its reconciliation with Syria adds an altogether new dimension to the deepening strategic ties between Moscow and Ankara. For Erdogan too, Syria becomes the newest addition to his policy initiatives lately to improve Turkey’s relations with the regional states. Normalization with Syria will go down well with Turkish public opinion and that has implications for Erdogan’s bid for a renewed mandate in the upcoming elections. From the Syrian perspective, the normalization with Turkey is going to be far more consequential than the restoration of ties with various regional states (starting with the UAE) in the recent years who had fueled the conflict. Turkey’s equations with Syrian militant groups (eg., Syrian National Army and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham), its continued occupation of Syrian territory, Syrian refugees in Turkey (numbering 3.6 million), etc. are vital issues affecting Syria’s security.

113-Russia’s influence in West Asia is growing

Bhadrakumar, 1-3, 23, MK Bhadrakumar is a former diplomat. He was India’s ambassador to Uzbekistan and Turkey., Russia consolidates in East Mediterranean, https://peoplesdispatch.org/2023/01/03/russia-consolidates-in-east-mediterranean/

Last week’s meetings in Moscow show that Russia’s standing in the West Asian region is far from defined by the Ukraine conflict. Russian influence on Syria remains intact and Moscow will continue to shape Syria’s transition out of conflict zone and consolidate its own long-term presence in Eastern Mediterranean. OPEC Plus has gained traction. Russia’s ties with the Gulf states are steadily growing. The Russia-Iran strategic ties are at its highest level in history. And the return of Benjamin Netanyahu as prime minister means that the Russian-Israeli ties are heading for a reset. Clearly, Russian diplomacy is on a roll in West Asia. Armenia and Azerbaijan are on the brink of war, Western diplomacy is needed to solve News.com, 1-2, 23, Experts: New war between Baku and Yerevan will be shorter, but no less dramatic than the conflict of 2020, https://news.am/eng/news/738031.html Two years after their last war over Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan appear to be headed for a new confrontation. Russia’s failures in Ukraine have upset the calculations in the region, the International Crisis Group writes. The new war will be shorter but no less dramatic than the six-week conflict of 2020. Since then, the balance has shifted further in favor of Azerbaijan. The Armenian army has not been replenishing its troops and armaments because Russia, its traditional arms seller, lacks supplies. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, is gaining ground. Its army is several times larger than that of Armenia, it is much better equipped and has the support of Turkey. Baku was also encouraged by the increased European demand for Azerbaijani gas. In particular, the report notes that after the 2020 cease-fire, Russia deployed peacekeepers to Karabakh and reinforced its border forces and military personnel on those parts of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border that became the new front line after the 44-day war. The idea was that even a small Russian contingent would deter attacks on Armenia because Baku would be wary of Moscow. After the war in Ukraine, however, these calculations did not materialize. Russian forces failed to prevent several outbreaks last year. In March and August, Azerbaijani troops seized new territories in Nagorno-Karabakh, including strategic heights. In September, the Azerbaijani military seized territory from Armenia. Terrorist attacks became more and more bloody, the International Crisis Group notes. Experts say the war in Ukraine also overshadowed Armenian-Azerbaijani talks. According to their information, at the end of last year, Moscow accepted the European Union’s petition, hoping it would strengthen Russia’s peacekeeping mission. However, after the outbreak of war in Ukraine, Moscow perceived Brussels’ mediation as another attempt to curb Russia’s influence, and no matter how much the Western capitals try to convince them otherwise, the Kremlin refuses to intervene. As a result, two draft agreements are being circulated – one was developed by Russia, the other was developed by Armenia and Azerbaijan with the support of the West, the report notes, specifying that each of the documents concerns the restoration of communication and trade channels and the stabilization of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, leaving the fate of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh separate from the unstarted process for now. The Armenian-Azerbaijani project, supported by the West, is probably more promising, partly because it was developed by the sides, the experts express their opinion, stressing, however, that it is not clear how Moscow will react if this happens. On the other hand, according to the international crisis group, although the sides are trying to work out a joint project, their approaches are still very far from each other. All cards are in Baku’s hands, and Azerbaijan would benefit more from a possible deal, especially in terms of military and foreign policy, than if it tried to achieve these goals militarily, experts say, warning that the danger is that negotiations will lead nowhere, and either another military conflict will destroy the ways sponsored by both Moscow and the West, and Azerbaijan will take what it can by force.

112-US/Western led negotiations will protect the capitalist business interests of the West

Azerne News, 1-3, 23, Vigorous protests in Karabakh against plunder of Azerbaijani natural resources by Armenians underway, https://www.azernews.az/nation/204590.html

Protesters from all walks of life have been vigorously rallying against the illegal exploitation of Azerbaijan’s mineral resources in the Karabakh economic region by ethnic Armenian separatists in collaboration with Armenia’s various governments for over 20 years. At a conservative estimate, Armenians, hand in hand with offshore and European companies, have illegally pocketed billions of dollars from plundering Azerbaijan’s mineral resources both in Karabakh and around during the 30-year-long occupation and continued the same scheme of theft of gold, molybdenum, copper, and other mineral resources after the war under the supervision and in collaboration with the Russian peacekeepers. The Azerbaijani public has finally decided to say enough is enough and halt the continuous plunder, and thus on December 12, 2022, a group of eco-activists took to the streets to say this is the last straw. And they succeeded in it by kicking off open-ended pickets on the Lachin road through which Azerbaijani wealth from the interior of the earth has been transported to Armenia for further processing. One of the fundamental reasons for the international support for the Armenian claims now is the similarity of the business interests of certain political groups in Europe with those in Armenia and separatist Karabakh in the illegal exploitation of Azerbaijan’s mineral resources. In concert with wide-ranging corrupt political groups from across Europe, particularly in France and in the USA, separatists in Karabakh under the temporary control of the Russian peacekeepers pocket millions from the illegalities, and Azerbaijan’s determination though late to halt both looting and prevent ecocide trigger anti-Azerbaijani moves ranging from pressure at local, national and international levels, orchestrated by corrupt and criminal elements sitting at high-echelons of power and fed by Armenian diaspora

111-Strong diplomacy with Saudi Arabia needed to prevent it from turning to China

Burks, 1-2, 23, Cam Burks is a senior fellow at George Mason University’s National Security Institute. He is a corporate global security executive, previously serving in chief security officer and enterprise, geopolitical strategy leadership positions at Chevron Corporation and Adobe. He served for nearly 15 years in the Foreign Service as a special agent and American Embassy Regional Security Officer with the U.S. State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service. He is a network affiliate at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, Kingdom, come: The case for partnering with Saudi Arabia, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3786860-kingdom-come-the-case-for-partnering-with-saudi-arabia/

Saudi Arabia, the largest Gulf state and custodian of Islam’s two holiest sites, is the obvious candidate to help carry Washington’s water. The Kingdom long has had a robust defense relationship with the United States and U.S. and Saudi officials for decades have strived to maintain comity in the face of periodic differences and dustups that threatened to undermine bilateral ties. Indeed, after Israel, Saudi Arabia stands as our most-indispensable Middle Eastern partner. So, one might ask, if working with Riyadh represents such an obvious slam-dunk, why hasn’t Washington seized the ball and driven down the court? Answer, and question The answer is values. Happy to cooperate with the Kingdom privately, U.S. officials are loath to do so publicly because of the widespread perception that Saudi Arabia is just too different. It is a monarchy, and we are a republic. It cloisters women (albeit less so than before) and we celebrate their liberty. It punishes dissent; we champion freedom of expression. It hearkens to arch-conservative social mores, and we let it all hang out. The question also is values. More specifically, do they really matter as much as we think they do? Policymakers in Washington have no apparent difficulty tolerating what human rights groups say is Israel’s brutal treatment of the Palestinians, but they become positively apoplectic concerning the Kingdom’s rights record. Childhood’s end It is high time to dispense with such puerile thinking. Handwringing about remaking allies in our image retards our ability to consider clearly how best to achieve lasting security. International relations is a deadly serious game played for keeps, and we would do well to listen to Otto von Bismarck instead of Oprah. Friends make us feel good, partners help us get things done, and —mais oui! — it is lovely when a country like the United Kingdom can fill both roles. But when we need help — and there is no doubt we do in the Middle East — it hardly matters whether we admire the party rendering assistance or how much they resemble us. We must be mature enough to recognize that, when it comes to advancing our interests, our enemies’ enemy is our friend. The White House should extend its hand to Riyadh. It should dispense with notions of pride and face and say to the Kingdom, “Come, work with us on finding a path forward through the challenges that lie ahead.” I propose three steps forward: Invite de facto ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to Washington for a strategy summit with President Biden. Would this provoke a media firestorm and partisan cries of hypocrisy? Of course, but the juice — gaining Saudi help in a range of issues from quashing Sunni extremism to engineering a soft landing for the Iranian regime’s successor — will be well worth the squeeze. Encourage bilateral investment. Despite the current oil-price windfall, the Kingdom faces serious economic challenges (including towering unemployment among the aforementioned high-expectations youth) that U.S. private-sector innovation can help it to overcome. Facilitate people-to-people exchanges. Few things are more impactful on hearts and minds than personal encounters revealing our shared humanity. Reducing barriers to Saudi students and helping U.S. universities to open campuses in the Kingdom will create a cadre of future U.S. and Saudi leaders with an intimate appreciation of what “the other” brings to table. The time is now. Among the lessons U.S. policymakers drew from Iran in 1979 and Lebanon in the 1980s was the danger of hubris. Ours is the most powerful nation the world has ever seen, but we imperil ourselves by confusing might with omnipotence. In a region as fraught and complex as the Middle East, there is no shame in recognizing we need help in securing our interests. Saudi Arabia’s centrality — geographically, politically, socially and economically — make it uniquely positioned to render assistance. The Biden administration should treat the Kingdom as a partner, not a gas station or a piggy bank, to anchor it firmly in our camp and to influence it with our values. With White House missteps leading Riyadh to question Washington’s commitment to Saudi security, and to the region more generally, now is the time to act. Failure to do so would be tantamount to pushing Riyadh into Beijing’s and/or Moscow’s embrace, where it can do us no good — and potentially a lot of harm.

Iran nuclear deal enables Iranian aggression

110-Security guarantees mean Israel and Saudi Arabia will cement ties

Ariel Kahana, 1-2, 23, Netanyahu might have to turn US policy on its head, https://www.israelhayom.com/2023/01/02/netanyahus-might-have-to-turn-us-policy-on-its-head/

Amid the brouhaha of the past several days as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu put the final touches on his government, he also set his sights on two major personal foreign policy goals. The first is his life’s mission – to stop the Iranian nuclear project. The second – to strike a peace accord with Saudi Arabia and thus put a practical end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Realizing those two objectives may not seem to be such a hard feat at first glance, precisely because they are intertwined: Saudi Arabia detests Iran just as much as Israel does. The enemy of my enemy is my friend, the old adage says. In other words, having given tacit agreement to the Abraham Accords between Israel and four Arab states and opened its airspace for Israeli overflights, and let dual Israeli citizens enter the kingdom (along with subtle cooperation on other matters), Riyadh has every reason to move closer to Jerusalem. But the obstacles that have stalled this have nothing to do with reasons and everything to do with circumstances. The peace deal with Bahrain and the UAE was finalized during the Trump administration, under what was perceived to be a powerful American umbrella. Today, at least in the eyes of regional power brokers, the US presence in the region pales in comparison. The Saudi regime feels it cannot trust the US. Just recently, China’s President Xi Jinping was treated like royalty when he visited the kingdom and announced a host of collaboration projects between the countries. Such a reception was in stark contrast to the cold shoulder President Joe Biden got when he visited there in the summer. The Saudis are justifiably of the view that Washington should have ratcheted up the pressure to the maximum on Iran. That was the right thing to do before the Hijab protest broke out and prior to Iran entering the Ukraine theater by helping Russia with drones; it is doubly true now – from a moral standpoint but also for political and security reasons. The US has continued to treat Iran with kid gloves. Although it has been lending a hand, it has not been fully behind the protest movement in Iran. It has also shied away from creating a direct threat to Iran’s nuclear program. Had Saudi Arabia and Israel been given a US umbrella against Iran, they would have found it easier to work together. Lacking such protection, both countries will have to resort to under-the-radar coordination that will most likely stay under wraps.

109-Iran nuclear deal enables Iranian aggression

Stricker, 1-1, 23, Andrea Stricker is deputy director of the nonproliferation and biodefense program and a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Follow her on Twitter @StrickerNonpro. FDD is a nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy, In 2023, Washington Can’t Neglect Iran, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/2023-washington-can%E2%80%99t-neglect-iran-206069

U.S. Iran policy currently rests on the hope that Tehran will not intensify its malign conduct as Washington focuses on other priorities: arming Ukraine, competing with China, and a range of domestic issues. The West is hedging its bets: If Iran’s uprising fails, the 2015 nuclear deal with Tehran, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), remains an option to bribe Tehran to temporarily refrain from dashing to nuclear weapons. The West seems unconcerned that the deal’s revival would pump some $1 trillion in revenue to Iran by 2030, helping the regime shore up its hold on power, repress its people, and attack its neighbors.

108-Iran deal is dead

The president acknowledged on camera that the JCPOA is dead, but his administration will not announce its demise. Biden may believe doing so would cause the regime to rush to the nuclear threshold. The reaction from Tehran? It keeps moving toward the nuclear threshold.

107-It’s possible to revive the Iran nuclear deal

Financial Tribune, 1-1, 2023, CPOA Revival Still Possible Despite Challenges, https://financialtribune.com/articles/national/116610/jcpoa-revival-still-possible-despite-challenges

China said the talks to restore the 2015 Iran nuclear deal are in the “final phase”, emphasizing that there is still an opportunity to reach a final agreement on the revival of the accord. “Despite the complex and challenging prospects facing the talks, there is still hope for reaching an agreement” to revive the nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said at a regular press conference on Monday, according to the ministry’s website. She urged all parties to the agreement to stay committed to dialogue and step up diplomatic efforts to “bring the JCPOA back on track as soon as possible.” Pointing to Iran’s sincerity in seeking an agreement on the JCPOA resumption, she urged all concerned parties to “work in the same direction, make the right decision, take positive and constructive steps forward, avoid linking the Iranian nuclear issue with other issues and help the negotiations produce an outcome at an early date.”

106-Iran nuclear deal is dead

Margarat Brennan, Fox and former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster, 1-1-2023, to Videos, https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2023/01/01/hr_mcmaster_chances_are_quite_high_israel_will_strike_irans_nuclear_program_in_2023.htmlH.R. McMaster: “Chances Are Quite High” Israel Will Strike Iran’s Nuclear Program In 2023

MARGARET BRENNAN: Oone of the things you’re saying there is recognition that the attempt to broker a nuclear deal with Iran is dead.

H.R. MCMASTER: It’s a pipe dream. It’s trying to revive something that is completely dead. And I couldn’t believe it, Margaret, as- as we were supplicating to the Iranian regime as they’re intensifying their proxy war in the region, and attacking some of our- of our long-standing partners there, the- the Saudi- Saudi Arabia and, and the UAE. And I think we lost a lot of ground in the Middle East, because we’re chasing this pipe dream of trying to revive this- this nuclear agreement. And if we didn’t Margaret, what would happen- what would happen is we’d give Iran a pass on- on the destructive effect that the dictatorship has had on the Iranian economy. And you know, where that money would go, that money would go into the bonyads, which are these collectives controlled by the theocratic dictatorship, who extend their patronage network and control and that money would go to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, who would, as they did after the first Iran nuclear deal, intensify their proxy war against us, their Arab neighbors, and especially against Israel

105-Azerbaijan’s blockade of Nagrorno-Karabakh risks genocide

Billy Hallowell, 1-1, 2023, https://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/2023/january/genocide-warning-as-armenian-christians-face-potential-horror-nagorno-karabakh-official-speaks-out, ‘Genocide’ Warning: As Armenian Christians Face Potential Horror, Nagorno-Karabakh Official Speaks Out

Chaos is once again brewing over Nagorno-Karabakh, a small, landlocked region between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This area, also known as Artsakh and comprised chiefly of Armenian Christians, has been disputed for decades. But experts are sounding the alarm, as the typical chaos plaguing the area has recently escalated. Azerbaijani residents reportedly blocked the Lachin corridor Dec. 12, the only land passage into Nagorno-Karabakh, cutting off food, medical supplies, and travel between the area and Armenia. That blockade is now approaching its second week, with desperation increasing. A TRULY DIRE SITUATION The situation is so dire a group of human rights organizations issued a genocide warning Monday, cautioning how deadly and diabolical the situation could become. “The current Azerbaijani aggression against the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh conforms to a long pattern of ethnic and religious cleansing of Armenian and other Christian communities in the region by the government of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Turkey, the Ottoman Empire, and their partisans,” the warning reads, in part. The blockade is the clear catalyst for the increased alarm. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry placed blame for the closure on Russian peacekeepers who are responsible for the area under a 2020 peace agreement. Part of that treaty called for Azerbaijan to ensure the safe passage of materials along that road, which is purportedly no longer happening. The blockade is sparking a crisis Ruben Vardanyan, minister of state for Nagorno-Karabakh, is hoping to see remedied as quickly as possible, as his citizens do not have access to travel or much-needed resources.

104-China-Saudi ties increasing

Tom Porter, 1-1, 2023, Business Insider, How Saudi Arabia’s crown prince snubbed Biden repeatedly to forge ties with authoritarian China and Russia, https://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabia-snubs-us-embraces-china-russia-2022-12

In Riyadh in early December, China’s President Xi Jinping met with Saudi Arabia’s de-facto ruler, Mohammed bin Salman, to announce a “new era” in relations between the countries. They touted sweeping new trade and energy deals, and alignment on issues ranging from the war in Yemen, to digital infrastructure and space research. It was the culmination of years of alliance-building between Beijing and Riyadh in their increasingly brazen opposition to US global dominance. “Saudi Arabia and China each find each other useful. They have significant economic ties, and they expect those to grow,” the analyst Jon Alterman told Insider in an interview. “While their concerns about US global leadership are very different, they both agree that a unipolar world led by the United States would undermine their interests,” said Altermann, a senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. For China, the US stands in the way of further expanding its global influence. For Saudi Arabia, it sees economic opportunity and the possibility of taking a bigger global role where several great powers are competing. And it’s not just China that Saudi Arabia has been growing closer to, provoking US concern, but another authoritarian superpower and US adversary: Russia. Back in October, Riyadh infuriated the Biden administration by announcing in tandem with Russia that it would be cutting oil production. The deal was reportedly a shock to Biden administration officials, who believed they had secured a secret agreement with Saudi Arabia to increase production in a bid to ease domestic inflation.

103-Saudi Arabia won’t trust US security guarantees because they think the next President will revoke them

The nation is essentially hedging its bet, reacting to shifting rhetoric from Washington, DC, and declining US commitment to the Middle East “The Saudis fear it is reckless to rely entirely on the United States, whose long-term intentions they distrust and whose attitude toward Saudi Arabia has shifted dramatically between the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations,” said Alterman.

102-No risk of Turkey attack on Greece; their evidence is hype

Elana Becatoros, 12-31, 22, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-turkey-greece-government-0fac79560b01e5c59677be0388ee5d34, Despite rhetoric, Greek-Turkish armed conflict seen remote

Both countries face national elections in the first half of 2023, which is likely to ramp up the rhetoric still further, and Russia’s war in Ukraine has demonstrated that an invasion of a smaller European country by a larger neighboring power is no longer unthinkable. But analysts on both sides of the Aegean Sea are cautious, noting an escalation in verbal barbs but still assessing a military conflict between neighbors Greece and Turkey as unlikely. Traditional adversaries, the countries are no strangers to tension. Mock dogfights by fighter jets over the Aegean have taken place for decades as the two sides disagree on the limits of Greece’s national airspace. They are at loggerheads over a broad variety of other issues, including the ethnically divided island of Cyprus, maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea and territorial claims in the Aegean Sea, through which their joint border runs. In 2021, Turkish and Greek warships shadowed each other and briefly collided during a heated dispute over exploration rights to potential offshore energy reserves. Greece and Turkey have come close to war three times in the past half-century. The most recent was in January 1996, when a last-minute U.S. intervention averted an armed conflict over an obscure pair of uninhabited islets named Imia in Greek and Kardak in Turkish. ….. Ankara recently has focused on the militarization of the Greek islands in the eastern Aegean Sea, saying international treaties prohibit the presence of armed forces. Greece counters that it is adhering to the treaties and needs to defend the islands against a potential attack from Turkey, which maintains a sizable military force on its nearby coast. Turkey “is building a story, a narrative, so it can (potentially) attribute its own aggressive act against Greece to legitimate self-defense,” Filis said, a tactic that “has many similarities with what Russia did and is doing in Ukraine.” Still, chances of open conflict — or of an accident or military incident triggering an unplanned escalation — remain slim, both analysts agreed. An armed conflict is “still a very, very low probability,” Unluhisarcikli said, noting that past accidents, such as collisions between navy vessels or jet crashes during island patrols, had not led Turkey and Greece to war. A military incident or conflict “is a scenario that doesn’t have much probability,” said Filis. “But the climate that the Turkish leadership is cultivating could make something like that easier.”

101-China will not provide security guarantees to Saudi Arabia even if Saudi Arabia wants them

Zakheim, 12-30, 22, Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was under secretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy under secretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987, The Hill, Saudi Arabia still needs the United States, despite its growing ties to China, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3792146-saudi-arabia-still-needs-the-united-states-despite-its-growing-ties-to-china/

China’s increasing economic involvement in Saudi Arabia does not necessarily translate into a security relationship, however. China may indeed be “an all-weather friend,” as a former Pakistani prime minister once told me, but whatever the weather, that friendship has its strict limits. In particular, China has demonstrated a reluctance to provide any country with security guarantees. Indeed, despite its joint proclamation with Russia just prior to the invasion of Ukraine, stating that “friendship between the two States has no limits, there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation,” Beijing has not felt compelled by its strategic partnership to bolster Moscow’s urgent need for military materiel. Moreover, China’s policy is to remain aloof from regional rivalries while spreading its influence throughout the Middle East. In that regard, Beijing is party to another long-term partnership with the Kingdom’s arch-enemy, Iran. Moreover, in contrast to Beijing’s economic undertakings with the Saudis, the 25-year China-Iran cooperation agreement that the two countries signed in March 2021 not only involves a reported $400 billion Chinese investment in Iran, but has a major military component as well. Indeed, in January, together with Russia, China held naval exercises in the northern Indian Ocean — they had also jointly exercised in 2019 – and in late April, Chinese State Councilor and Minister of National Defense Gen. Wei Fenghe led a senior military delegation to Beijing for talks on military cooperation. Wei met with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, as well as with his counterpart, Defense Minister Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, and with Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief of Staff Mohammad Bagheri. After his meeting with Wei, Bagheri confirmed journalistic speculation that China and Iran had “agreed to expand bilateral cooperation in joint military drills, exchange of strategies, training issues, and other common fields. None of this can be welcome news in Riyadh, which remains concerned about Iran’s threat to its security. Sharing a common enemy, the Saudis are expanding their security ties to Israel. But the Israelis, who have serious security needs of their own, are unlikely to come to Saudi Arabia’s aid with anything like the support that the United States gave to Kuwait after the 1990 Iraqi occupation of that country. At the end of the day, therefore, Riyadh will still need to look to America to underpin its security. And even if Washington’s focus is on peer competitors in Europe and Asia, as it should be, if Saudi Arabia finds itself desperate for assistance in the face of an imminent Iranian threat, its longstanding friendship with the United States most certainly will come into play. Whatever its current differences with the Saudis, America, unlike China, surely can be trusted not to let them down in their time of extreme need.

100-Increasing China-Arab ties come at the expense of the US

Dr. Mustafa Fetouri, 12-29, 22, Middle East Monitor, The long overdue China-Arab summit highlights Beijing’s increasing assertiveness, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20221229-the-long-overdue-china-arab-summit-highlights-beijings-increasing-assertiveness/

Almost all major Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, are traditional US allies in the Middle East and any Chinese advances in this part of the world would come at the expense of the US. While Washington-Tehran relations are at their lowest, Beijing-Tehran ties are expanding without upsetting Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran’s regional rival. So far, Beijing has demonstrated an ability to perform a delicate balancing act in the region. President Xi, in his speech, highlighted “solidarity” and “inclusiveness.”

99-China-Saudi ties are increasing

It is worth remembering here that the Saudi Kingdom only recognised China as an independent state in 1990; yet bilateral relations between the two have expanded rather quickly. For example, last year, China bought some $43.9 billion worth of Saudi oil; that is one quarter of the kingdom’s oil exports or nearly 77 per cent of Beijing’s overall imports from Riyadh. In the same year China spent nearly $5 billion on Saudi plastics and another $5.6 billion buying Saudi organic chemicals. In the same year, Saudi Arabia spent nearly $16.50 billion on Chinese made electrical, electronic goods, machinery and vehicles. Oil, though, remains the main Chinese import from Arab countries like Kuwait, Oman and Iraq.

98-The US should use diplomacy to boost Israel-Saudi ties. This will create deterrence against Iran and protect US interests in the Middle East

Omri Mahmias, 12-28, 22, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-726032, Is Israel-Saudi Arabia normalization ‘ready for prime time’?

WASHINGTON – In the eight weeks since the Israeli elections, there has been growing speculation that normalization between Israel and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia might be back on the table. Hebrew daily Yediot Aharonot reported talks were underway between Israel, the US and Saudi Arabia with respect to a normalization deal between the Jewish state and the Gulf country. Richard Goldberg, the senior adviser at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said we’ve “definitely seen the Biden administration pivot toward embracing the Abraham Accords over the last few months – something we didn’t see in the president’s first year.” Last week, Goldberg hosted Benjamin Netanyahu on his podcast, where the prime minister-designate said he would love to see full normalization between the countries. Last week, Goldberg hosted Benjamin Netanyahu in his podcast, where the incoming prime minister said he would love to see a full normalization between the country. “Since the White House hasn’t been able to jump-start the US-Saudi relationship or provide any clear wins for the Palestinians, the administration might view Saudi-Israel normalization talks as a way to do both,” Goldberg said. Is US support needed for Israel-Saudi normalization? Some media reports suggested that such progress would also be linked to possible support from the US, such as approving the sale of F-35 fighter jets to the kingdom. According to Goldberg, “A lot will depend on what assurances MBS [Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman] is willing to provide the United States and Israel. Normalizing relations with Israel would be a strategic game changer, as it was for the UAE. But Washington also needs assurances that Riyadh will stop playing military and nuclear footsie with Beijing,” he noted. For the long-term stability of the Middle East, the US has an enormous amount to gain, he added. “Saudi-Israel normalization will be the linchpin to regional economic integration and counter-extremism – in addition to formalizing a security architecture to deter and eventually defeat the Islamic Republic of Iran without drawing American military resources away from much-needed deterrence in the Asia-Pacific theater.” Goldberg also said the incoming government in Israel won’t be an obstacle in this regard. “Netanyahu and MBS gave birth to the Abraham Accords — they have a level of trust that cannot be matched,” Goldberg said. “If anything, the incoming government gives MBS the opportunity to claim greater victories in a normalization deal — much as the UAE spun a victory in 2020.” AARON DAVID MILLER, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said, “When the meeting between an Israeli prime minister and a Saudi crown prince or king happens, it will not be the first time it has occurred.” Miller likened the Israeli-Saudi relationship to an iceberg. “Most of what’s interesting on the intelligence-security side and the meetings with senior Israeli officials is occurring below the waterline. We never see it,” he said. “But there’s no doubt that there’s a serious foundation that links these two countries together. The public aspect is the Abraham Accords, of course. But what’s underneath and what’s driving this relationship is a couple of things that are indigenous to the region. First, the clear reality is both countries are fundamentally concerned and worried about Iran. Second, is the rise of Sunni jihadis, Islamic State, [or] al-Qaeda elements.” There is also an exhaustion and frustration with the Palestinian issue, Miller said. “So, what’s occurring between Israel and Saudi Arabia is real, and it’s enduring.” He noted that the US has an important role to play in bringing the two countries together. “Part of the alignment that has occurred between Israel and the Emiratis, the Bahrainis and the Saudis has a lot to do with the repositioning of the United States,” Miller said. When a great power decides that it has de-prioritized the region, which the United States is doing, there is a great concern on the part of Israel and the Gulf states.” Miller added that the Emiratis have set the bar very high – a new set of relationships that go beyond a simple exchange of ambassadors and embassies. “I think Mr. Netanyahu imagines a much more robust relationship with Saudi Arabia. Whether it could go as far as the Emirates, it is unclear,” said Miller. “[But] that’s really what we’re talking about.”

97-US security commitments to Saudi Arabia will overcome obstacles to strengthening Saudi-Israeli ties

Omri Mahmias, 12-28, 22, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-726032, Is Israel-Saudi Arabia normalization ‘ready for prime time’?

Israel-Saudi ties not ready for prime time? “There are several reasons why. First, there is the constraint on the accession and whether or not MBS would be able to do this without full authority as a king,” Miller said. “Second, you’ve got the most right-wing government in Israel’s history emerging.” A third constraint, he said, is that the US-Saudi relationship is “as dysfunctional as I’ve seen it in the past six administrations” as the countries are divided on many issues, from human rights to oil production and the relationship with China. “The sun, the moon and the stars are just not aligned right now.” Dennis Ross, a distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, weighed in as well. “Is there a possibility of normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia? Yes, but one should not exaggerate the near-term chances,” Ross said. “MBS has been clear with many visitors about what is important to him to move on normalization. Put simply, he needs a number of commitments from the US that would provide greater certainty about its security and the nature of American support. “Normalizing with Israel would increase Iranian threats to Saudi Arabia,” Ross continued. “MBS clearly wants more of a set of formal security assurances. This is less about F-35s and more about formalized commitments.” He said the administration, knowing the mood in Congress and its own instincts, “is not inclined to make such commitments at this point.”

96-US diplomacy responsible for Israel-Lebanon peace

ROUDI BAROUDI, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR – 12/28/22, Lebanon-Israel deal counts as big win for both parties — and for US diplomacy, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3790958-lebanon-israel-deal-counts-as-big-win-for-both-parties-and-for-us-diplomacy/

The United States accomplished a diplomatic tour de force in October when Lebanon and Israel agreed to settle most of their maritime boundary.

Of course, credit for this achievement is also due to the principals, but U.S. mediation was essential to setting the stage for the mostly indirect negotiations, regaining momentum when it looked like the process might be permanently stalled, and keeping the parties on-course until they reached agreement. Simply put, in this instance, the U.S. really was the “indispensable nation” it has so often strived to be The very fact that an agreement was reached is itself a remarkable departure from decades of mutual enmity between Lebanon and Israel. After all, the deal is anything but the usual sort between two sides that have recently been at odds over one or more particular issues Instead, from the moment of Israel’s establishment in 1948, a state of war has existed between it and Lebanon. A cease-fire was agreed to the following year, but since then there have been countless confrontations between the two sides, including at least three full-scale wars (1978, 1982, 2006), multiple smaller conflicts, a 22-year occupation of South Lebanon ending (for the most part) in 2000, and hundreds of skirmishes. Although the Lebanese have sustained far more than their share of losses in blood and treasure alike, the Israelis also have paid a painful price. Each side has plenty of reasons to distrust the other, and any Lebanese or Israeli advocating accommodation between the two risks running afoul of powerful domestic constituencies bent on continued mutual hatred. It took more than a decade of intermittent contacts, virtually all of them consisting of messages exchanged through American intermediaries, but eventually logic prevailed, and the deal got done. And it’s a good deal for both sides. The Israelis have been extracting offshore gas since 2004 and exporting some of it to Jordan since 2017, but the agreement enhances their ability to expand production and tap enormous markets in Europe. Lebanon’s gas industry is far less advanced, so recognition of its maritime boundaries is even more important: Recognition of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) makes it a viable destination for the foreign investment required for offshore hydrocarbon activities, and the country’s crippling economic and financial crises make the chance to become energy self-sufficient and even earn badly needed export revenues even more attractive.

95-17 million Houthis need food assistance

Cohen, 12-27, 22, Jordan Cohen is a policy analyst at the Cato Institute, an Expert at the Forum on the Arms Trade, and a PhD candidate in political science at George Mason University. Jonathan Ellis Allen is a research associate and producer at the Cato Institute, The Hill, It is time for Congress to hold Saudi Arabia responsible for its victims, https://thehill.com/opinion/congress-blog/3789858-it-is-time-for-congress-to-hold-saudi-arabia-responsible-for-its-victims/

Saudi Arabia’s goals in Yemen are simple: empower a puppet leader and cause suffering to any political opposition, even if they are civilians. Saudi Arabia formed a coalition in 2015 to reinstall President Mahdi al-Mashat to power in Yemen after he was overthrown by the Houthis during the Arab Spring. The Saudi-led coalition has launched a war that has consisted of only an air campaign and blockade. The former has come under criticism for using U.S. weapons to target civilians. The latter has left over 17.6 million Yemenis needing food assistance. Overall, civilians account for more than 19,200 of the total killed or maimed in Yemen.

94-Arms sold to Saudi Arabia end up in the arms of terrorists

The Cato Institute’s annual Arms Sales Risk Index, which measures negative factors linked to arms sales such as dispersion, diversion, and the misuse of weapons by recipients, found Saudi Arabia to be one of the 30 riskiest countries to sell weapons to, as the kingdom uses weapons for human rights abuses, there are high levels of government corruption in Saudi Arabia, and there is a high risk those weapons will find their way into the wrong peoples’ hands. Beyond the sheer civilian damage, reports suggest that weapons sold to the coalition ending up on the black market and are being sold to terrorist groups. Nonetheless, Riyadh is also America’s No. 1 arms purchaser 13 years running because three straight administrations have prioritized defense contractors’ profits over human rights.

93-Sanctions easily circumvented

Demarais, 12-27, 22, Foreign Affairs, The End of the Age of Sanctions?, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/end-age-sanctions

Yet the golden days of U.S. sanctions may soon be over. As Washington has come to rely more and more heavily on sanctions, many rogue states have begun to harden their economies against such measures. Three events over the past decade in particular have convinced them to do so. In 2012, the United States cut Iran off from SWIFT, the global messaging system that enables virtually all international payments, in a bid to isolate the country financially. Other U.S. enemies took note, wondering whether they might be next. Then, in 2014, Western countries imposed sanctions on Russia after it annexed Crimea, prompting Moscow to make economic autonomy a priority. Finally, in 2017, Washington started a trade war with Beijing, which soon spilled over to the technological sector. By restricting the export of U.S. semiconductor know-how to China, the United States put its adversaries on notice that their access to crucial technology could be severed Individually, currency-swap agreements, alternative payment systems, and digital currencies would not have much of an impact on the efficacy of U.S. sanctions. But together, these innovations are increasingly giving countries the ability to conduct transactions through sanctions-proof channels. This trend appears irreversible. There is no reason to believe that relations between Washington and Beijing or Washington and Moscow will improve anytime soon. The likeliest scenario is that things get worse, prompting Beijing and Moscow to double down on their sanctions-proofing efforts. The rise of a fragmented financial landscape threatens both U.S. diplomacy and national security. In addition to undermining the effectiveness of sanctions, the rise of sanctions-proof financial channels means that the United States will increasingly have a blind spot when it comes to detecting illicit global activities.

92-No deal on Nagarno-Karabakh is possible because Armenia wants its territorial integrity respected but won’t support Azerbaijan’s

Farid Shafiyev is Chairman of the Baku-based Center of Analysis of International Relations, 12-27, 22, Azerbaijan’s Lachin Road Conundrum, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/azerbaijan%E2%80%99s-lachin-road-conundrum-206061

The Lachin road conundrum has three elements: the immediate cause, the ecological problems and the illegal exploitation of Azerbaijan’s natural resources; the use of the Lachin corridor for military purposes, contrary to the Trilateral Statement; and finally, the obligation to open transportation links (also in accordance with the Trilateral Statement). Azerbaijan provides passage via the Lachin road. Moreover, Armenian and foreign (for example, Iranian) trucks use other roads through Azerbaijan’s territory, such as the Goris–Kafan route. However, Armenia, under various pretexts, refuses to create a passage from Azerbaijan proper to its exclave of Nakhichevan that passes through Armenian territory—something that is stipulated in Article 9 of the Trilateral Statement. Overall, the situation over the Lachin road points to more fundamental problems: the lack of a formalized peace treaty (rather than a ceasefire agreement) and the current stalemate in negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan; the performance of Russian peacekeepers; the actions of radicals among Karabakh Armenians and the arrival of Ruben Vardanyan; and the attitudes of geopolitical actors/spoilers, such as France and Russia. If there is a solution, it lies in a durable peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan based on the mutual recognition of territorial integrity. Unfortunately, the leading Armenian approach to peace remains the following: Azerbaijan must unconditionally recognize Armenia’s territorial integrity while Armenia will continue to regard “Nagorno-Karabakh” as an “independent” entity and fight for it through international actors and organizations.

91-A “peace” deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan will only happen if Armenia agrees to be assimilated, which means genocide

Setrakian, 12-26, 22, Lara Setrakian is a journalist and the president of the Applied Policy Research Institute based in Yerevan, Armenia., Foreign Policy, The West Must Act to Avert War in Nagorno-Karabakh, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/26/nagorno-karabakh-lachin-corridor-protests-armenia-azerbaijan/

“The peace the way Baku envisions it is a peace that is entirely established on its own terms,” said Eldar Mamedov, a Brussels-based foreign-policy analyst. “Aliyev is trying to apply pressure on the Armenian side to re-integrate the Karabakh region into Azerbaijan proper.” Armenians in Karabakh see full integration into Azerbaijan without security guarantees as a prelude to ethnic cleansing, either through direct violence or severe pressure to leave their homes. Azerbaijan has vowed to treat the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh as equal to its own citizens, which provides little comfort given Baku’s poor human rights record. Moreover, a series of gruesome incidents by Azerbaijani soldiers, including the execution of Armenian prisoners of war, sexual violence against women soldiers, and the mutilation and beheading of Armenian civilians have swelled their fears. “The fate of the Karabakh Armenians is a core issue for ending the hostility between the two countries. No one has laid out what’s the best way,” said Zaur Shiriyev of the International Crisis Group. Earlier this year, Armenian cultural heritage in Karabakh was targeted for erasure by a state committee in Baku, echoing the mass destruction of Armenian cultural artifacts in the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan. All of that has undermined confidence that Armenians have a safe place within Azerbaijani society.

90-US diplomacy. Is needed to stop Nagarno-Karabakh from escalating

In this toxic climate, the risks of escalation are not just clear, they are explicit pressure tactics. Azerbaijan has threatened a new, large-scale war if its demands over Nagorno-Karabakh are not met. Those demands have escalated since the 2020 war as Azerbaijan’s leverage has climbed; chiefly, they center on the full integration of Karabakh territory with no protected status for Armenians. Most controversially, Aliyev has threatened that he would take by force a strip of land across central Armenia as an extraterritorial corridor linking Azerbaijan proper to the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan, as well as to Turkey. The Armenian section would likely be administered by Russia, giving Moscow a permanent foothold across Armenian territory and seeding the potential for chronic security flare-ups along the route. It could also cut off Yerevan, Armenia’s capital, from the southern regions of Armenia, creating economic, administrative, and humanitarian havoc. The conditions for stability in the South Caucasus have broken down and will continually decline if they are left alone. Responsible powers need to reconfigure the dynamics in a way that ensures peace and prosperity for all, with no country eating its neighbor for lunch. Russia’s vision for the region may be one of ongoing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, simply to justify its peacekeeping presence and give it a more permanent place at the juncture of Armenia, Iran, and Azerbaijan. But apart from that strategic upside for Moscow, constant conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is bad for nearly everyone. It encourages aggressive behavior from the stronger party, results in loss of life on both sides, and erodes Western influence and ability to negotiate a lasting settlement. This is the time for the West to use its significant stores of unspent capital, through levers of hard and soft power, to bring Armenia and Azerbaijan back to the negotiating table. “There are considerations by Aliyev that would steer away from full-scale war, but it is not a given,” Mamedov said. “What would stop it is if the Western community, the U.S. and the European Union, sends a very clear message that Azerbaijan will pay a diplomatic and economic price.” “You need to have a mediator that is able to coerce or incentivize a state to take a step forward. There is no other way to do it,” said Kamal Makili-Aliyev (no relation to President Aliyev), an associate professor at the University of Gothenburg who has written a book analyzing the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Without a strong guiding mediator, the outcome will be a “never-ending conflict in the Caucasus.” The dangerous slide toward conflict is one that the West can skillfully resolve. While the European Union facilitated recent peace talks, it is still the United States that underwrites the weight of the Western position. Washington needs to act like the “supervisor” keeping diplomatic efforts on track, said Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute. That means wielding tools that include suspending U.S. military assistance to Baku. The United States provided $164 million in security support to Azerbaijan from 2002 to 2020, without sufficient oversight of key conditions, such as ensuring it was not used by Azerbaijan for offensive purposes against Armenia. Washington should also consider various economic sanctions on the country until Baku consistently chooses diplomacy over forcefully imposed outcomes. “More of a nuclear option would be Global Magnitsky Sanctions on [Azerbaijani] military commanders, if not on Aliyev himself and his family,” Rubin said. The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, which U.S. President Joe Biden permanently reauthorized in April, allows the United States to target foreign individuals involved in human rights abuse, freeze their U.S.-based assets, limit access to U.S. visas, and block business transactions. Switzerland can become a more vocal guardian and guarantor of the Geneva Conventions, which are being violated on the ground. The European Union could impose targeted sanctions, consistent with its commitment to human rights. Pairing accountability with incentives, the European Union and United States can offer improved trade relations if the issues between Armenia and Azerbaijan are resolved. Baku can be a more responsible and productive partner for its allies if it curbs aggressive behaviors.

89-Turkey is trying to broker a deal to end the Ukraine war

Agence France Presse, 12-, 24, 22, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20221224-turkey-says-ukraine-war-will-not-end-easily, Turkey says Ukraine war ‘will not end easily’

Turkey, which helped broker a deal with the United Nations for the export of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea this summer, is seeking to bring together Russian and Ukrainian leaders for negotiations to end the war. It already hosted a meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers during the early stages of the war in March and held other talks between the two warring parties in Istanbul. “As Turkey, we call for a ceasefire, at least a humanitarian ceasefire. Then a permanent ceasefire and then peace talks,” Akar said. Turkey has however shied away from Western sanctions against Russia with which it has boosted trade while supplying Ukraine with combat drones.

88-US relations with Turkey already low

Orban Cocksun, 12-24, 22, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-talks-with-russia-about-using-syrian-airspace-potential-operation-2022-12-24/,

Turkey sees the YPG militia, the leading presence in the SDF, as the Syrian wing of the PKK, which is considered a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the United States and the European Union. Washington’s support for the YPG in the fight against Islamic State has infuriated Ankara, causing a major rift between the NATO allies.

87-US cooperating on security with Saudi Arabia now

Jared Szuba, 12-23, 22, AL-Monitor, US working with Saudi Arabia on strategic military plans, general says, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/12/us-working-saudi-arabia-strategic-military-plans-general-says#ixzz7oTqt8HUL, US working with Saudi Arabia on strategic military plans, general says

American military officials have been working behind the scenes to help counterparts in Saudi Arabia lay out a long-term vision for the kingdom’s national security, even as ties between the two governments remain strained, a top US general revealed Thursday. “The Saudis are very interested in strategic plans with us,” Gen. Michael “Erik” Kurilla, top commander of US forces in the Middle East, told reporters via conference call. “Our strategic planners travel to the kingdom regularly to work with Saudi military leaders to build up their ideas for a long-term strategic vision,” Kurilla explained. Saudi Arabia is also set to release a national defense strategy and a national military strategy next year for the first time in its history, he said. The strategy documents, which have not yet been publicly confirmed by Saudi officials, will codify “the kingdom’s strategic vision for national security and regional security,” the general said. Kurilla called the decision “a critical step” in Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s military modernization plans. Why it matters: The Biden administration is leveraging the Pentagon’s know-how to help the kingdom meet its security goals in a bid to rebuild trust, even as the White House says it is reevaluating US relations with Riyadh.

86-Difficulties in relations do not undermine security cooperation

Why it matters: The Biden administration is leveraging the Pentagon’s know-how to help the kingdom meet its security goals in a bid to rebuild trust, even as the White House says it is reevaluating US relations with Riyadh. The October announcement that OPEC+ would slash oil production drew rare pointed rebuke from the White House, but did not significantly disrupt regular meetings and bilateral training between the two countries’ militaries, Al-Monitor previously reported.

85-Saudis oppose outside efforts to mediate relations with Israel

MAJDI HALAB, 12-23, 22, Jerusalem Post, Israel’s relations with Saudi Arabia depend on progress with Palestinians – opinion, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-725676

It is important to note that Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has not wavered in its stance on relations with Israel. This comes after the Saudi Arabian government discontinued connections with Israel in all areas when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then-head of the Mossad, Yossi Cohen, arrived in the city of Neom in November 2020 without prior consultation, accompanied by then-United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. In private discussions, the Saudis have emphasized their lack of desire for anyone to act as a mediator between themselves and the Israelis. They also made it clear that the interests of the two countries overlap and the revival of security coordination depends solely on Israel’s willingness to make progress with the Palestinians.

84-Saudi-Israel relations cannot improve until the Palestine issue is resolved

MAJDI HALAB, 12-23, 22, Jerusalem Post, Israel’s relations with Saudi Arabia depend on progress with Palestinians – opinion, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-725676

In concusion, while there may be potential for improved relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, it is crucial for Netanyahu to understand and respect the conditions set forth by the Saudi leadership. Any progress toward normalization likely will depend on the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the fulfillment of the Arab Peace Initiative. In order to move forward, it will be necessary for both sides to engage in honest and constructive dialogue, taking into consideration the concerns and interests of all parties involved.

83-Saudis want strong US relations now

MAJDI HALAB, 12-23, 22, Jerusalem Post, Israel’s relations with Saudi Arabia depend on progress with Palestinians – opinion, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-725676

The Saudi crown prince is currently working to secure his position and prepare for his eventual ascension to the throne, while also striving to improve the strained relationship with the United States. He hopes that the United States will recognize his status and that the controversy surrounding the 2018 murder of journalist and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi will not hinder their relationship.

82-Saudi Arabia doesn’t think it can replace US weapons with weapons from China

MAJDI HALAB, 12-23, 22, Jerusalem Post, Israel’s relations with Saudi Arabia depend on progress with Palestinians – opinion, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-725676

The Saudis are seeking closer ties with China, but do not view this as coming at the expense of their relationship with the United States, which is considered their most important ally. They also do not have high hopes for Chinese weapons, which they view as on a similar level with those from Russia, and don’t expect any significant benefit to come from strengthening their relationship with China

81- of the current Syria situation; US diplomacy stops further Turkish aggression

Jonathan Spyer, 12-23, 22, Jerusalem Post, Turkish, Russian strategy for Syrian endgame emerging, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-725610

Since 2019, the Syrian situation has been largely at a stalemate, with authority divided among three de facto enclaves, each dependent on the sponsorship of outside powers. The Assad regime, guaranteed by Russia and Iran, controls around 60-65% of Syria’s territory, including the coastline and the main cities. The US-backed, Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces hold most of the area east of the Euphrates, comprising roughly 30% of Syria’s area. Turkey, in partnership with the self-styled “Syrian National Army” (the remnants of the Sunni Islamist rebellion, remustered under Turkish auspices) and with the jihadi Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group, controls an area in the northwest, comprising around 10% of Syrian territory.

This de facto partition has mostly held since early 2018. Turkey shifted the balance somewhat in October-November 2019, with a ground incursion east of the Euphrates. This resulted in the establishment of an enclave of Turkish-controlled territory biting into the Kurdish-controlled area, and in the deployment of regime and Russian forces east of the Euphrates in order to deter further Turkish advances. Since then, the military situation on the ground has been static, the broader question of Syria’s future unresolved.

There are currently indications of renewed movement. Specifically, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been carrying out an air campaign against targets in the Kurdish/US area since November 20. The Turkish president has already threatened a ground incursion, with the intention of pushing the Kurdish forces back 30 kilometers from the border and conquering three towns – Tal Rifaat, Manbij and Kobani. Kurdish sources told The Jerusalem Post that the Syrian Kurdish leadership had expected the invasion in late November. Its postponement appears to be the result of both American and Russian representations to and pressure on Ankara.

80-Turkey wants to invade Syria to attack the Kurd-related Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that are working with the US to stop attacks on ISIS

Winter, 12-23, 22, Dr. Charlie Winter is Director of Research at ExTrac, an AI-powered threat intelligence system. Over the last decade he has worked in a range of academic positions in the US and UK, researching how and why insurgents innovate to further their political and military agendas in both on and off-line spaces., THE ISLAMIC STATE IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT A NEW TURKISH OPERATION IN SYRIA, https://warontherocks.com/2022/12/the-islamic-state-is-cautiously-optimistic-about-a-new-turkish-operation-in-syria/

In internet forums over the past several weeks, Islamic State members have expressed cautious optimism about the benefits of a potential Turkish military operation in northeastern Syria. For the group’s scattered fighters, further Turkish attacks against the Syrian Democratic Forces could represent a unique opportunity to reconstitute their strength. Given the organization’s weakened (yet resilient) state, their optimism may well be misplaced. Still, it would be better for the world not to find out. Since late November, Ankara’s Operation Claw-Sword has been targeting Syria’s Kurdish forces with long-range missile and rocket strikes directed at bases and installations in Syria. Ankara has also repeatedly threatened a full-scale ground incursion, which Syrian Kurdish leaders have said would prevent them from continuing operations against the Islamic State. As Ankara continues to push back against U.S. and Russian opposition to its plans, U.S. policymakers should do all they can to ensure Islamic State forces don’t get the opportunity they’re hoping for. Pressure and Opportunity While Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan continues to brand the Syrian Democratic Forces a terrorist threat, they remain the primary bulwark against the Islamic State in Syria and a key enabler for the Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State. Claw-Sword has already degraded, and continues to degrade, the Syrian Democratic Forces’ infrastructure and capabilities — even bases that are shared with U.S. forces have been struck. Shortly after Ankara initiated the operation, the group stated publicly that it would not be able to maintain pressure on the Islamic State’s latent networks if it had to simultaneously withstand Turkish attacks. And the group’s senior officials have expressed their concern at the apparent lack of support from Global Coalition states in the face of the Turkish campaign. On Dec. 2, Syrian Kurdish forces declared a freeze on counter-Islamic State operations in northeastern Syria, including a suspension of all joint patrols, training activities, and special operations. While the moratorium was lifted later that same day, the incident speaks to the fragility of the situation and underscores the fact that, should Turkey at some point launch a new ground incursion into Syria, Kurdish fighters will not hesitate to reprioritize their resources and capabilities to defend themselves, even if that undermines wider Global Coalition counter-terrorism efforts. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Islamic State supporters in the region consider the degradation of the Syrian Democratic Forces to be a potentially transformative opportunity. Even the Islamic State’s own official reporting suggests its prospects in Syria have not looked all that good in recent months. Within minutes of Turkey’s first airstrike on Nov. 20, Islamic State supporters were heralding its new intervention as a strategic boon for the group’s increasingly embattled network across Syria. To a large extent, their response in the weeks since has been characterized by a sense of optimism, grounded in the idea that the current air campaign is only a preamble to a Turkish ground operation that will, as one munasir puts it, “grind whatever remains of the [Syrian Democratic Forces] into dust.” According to this reasoning, the collapse of the Syrian Democratic Forces — or even just the redirection of its resources away from counter-Islamic State operations — would permit an intensification of offensive activity. According to one prominent Islamic State military analyst on Telegram this would “end the stage of attrition,” meaning the low-intensity asymmetric warfare that the group is currently in, and “usher in a new period of bone-breaking tamkin.” In the Islamic State’s nomenclature, the word tamkin or “consolidation” refers to late-stage insurgency and territorial control, something we have not seen from the movement in Syria since early 2019…. But along with that kinetic pressure on the Islamic State, the United States should exert diplomatic pressure on Turkey — to the extent that it is possible — to mitigate the chances of a new ground incursion. If that were to happen and the Syrian Democratic Forces were to wind back its operations, however briefly, U.S. tactics in Syria would almost certainly shift toward short-term, reactive unilateralism rather than strategic interdiction efforts. This is a change that the counter-Islamic State mission can ill afford.

79 political capital link: Political opposition to providing more climate funding to developing countries

Ben Adler, 12-22, 22, Spending bill leaves out most of the climate change funding Biden sought, https://news.yahoo.com/spending-bill-leaves-out-most-of-the-climate-change-funding-biden-sought-232329331.html

The Senate passed the $1.7 billion omnibus spending bill Thursday, averting a government shutdown, but climate change activists are upset that a key promise of President Biden’s won’t be included in the package: $11.4 billion in climate aid per year to developing countries. In a September 2021 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, Biden pledged to increase U.S. assistance to low-income nations for combating climate change through building their clean energy economies and adapting to the dangerous effects of climate change, such as sea level rise, to $11.4 billion. Biden later moved his request to Congress up to 2023 — the fiscal year currently under consideration — including $2 billion the U.S. already owes the Green Climate Fund, a U.N. initiative that distributes climate financing. But, despite Biden’s fellow Democrats holding slim majorities in both houses of Congress, the spending package includes just $1.057 billion for international climate change aid. That is “only $900,000 more than the previous year’s already woefully short amount,” climate policy experts at the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) lamented in a blog post on Wednesday. A pledging conference of the Green Climate Fund in Paris, Oct. 25, 2019. (Pascal Rossignol/Reuters) Congressional Democrats had sought $3.4 billion for global climate programs this year, but Republicans blocked what Republicans on the Senate Appropriations Committee called “radical environmental and climate policies.” “Congress just bankrolled an $857 billion defense bill but failed to provide a single penny to meet our commitments to the Green Climate Fund — a step that would truly help us defend our country and our planet from chaos and instability,” Sen. Ed Markey, D-Mass., said on Twitter. As Bloomberg News observed, “with Republicans taking control of the House in January, the fiscal 2023 budget was seen as the last best chance for Biden to fulfill his commitment.”

78-Turkish incursion results in ISIS members being released from prison

Middle East Eye, 12-13, 22, US ‘very concerned’ about potential Turkish incursion into Syria, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-very-concerned-about-potential-turkish-incursion-syria

The top US military general for the Middle East said Thursday he was “very concerned” about Turkey’s potential land operation into Syria, which could lead to an influx of Islamic State fighters. “I’m very, very concerned about that because that can destabilise the region and call our SDF partners off of the [ISIS] prisons. They have about 28 prisons across northern Syria,” Centcom head, General Erik Kurilla said. Northeastern Syria’s Hasakah region is home to 14 overcrowded prisons where approximately 10,000 men and hundreds of adolescent boys are being held. Al-Roj and al-Hol camps are home to around 60,000 people: around 20,000 from Syria; 31,000 from Iraq; and up to 12,000, including 4,000 women and 8,000 children, from other countries. Turkey views the Syrian Democratic Forces as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which has waged a decades-long war for independence against Turkey. The US considers the group, known as the PKK, a terrorist organisation, but refuses to cut ties with the SDF, which is Washington’s main partner in the battle against IS. Turkey launched its first incursion into Syria in 2016. Ankara blamed a November bombing in Istanbul on Kurdish militants and has since threatened a new assault. The Kurds denied involvement. Kurilla said a new Turkish incursion could lead to the release of IS prisoners. He pointed to a January breakout of almost 4,000 IS detainees which lead to heavy fighting between the militants and the SDF. “It could cause them to pull off of those [prisons] and put those at risk,” Kurilla told reporters in a phone briefing on Thursday. “So anything we can do to de-escalate the situation and prevent that incursion by the Turks will be important,” he added.

77-Pushing Turkey more means undermining Turkey’s cooperation on Russia

Middle East Eye, 12-13, 22, US ‘very concerned’ about potential Turkish incursion into Syria, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-very-concerned-about-potential-turkish-incursion-syria

“So anything we can do to de-escalate the situation and prevent that incursion by the Turks will be important,” he added. The US has been lobbying Turkey against an incursion over the last several weeks, but analysts are sceptical Washington’s warnings will dissuade the Turks. The US is also walking a tightrope as it looks to keep Turkey in its camp over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

76-Turkish incursion into Syria not enough to re-constitute the Islamic State

All that being said, the Islamic State response to Claw-Sword also highlights the group’s current weakness and its limited capacity to fully capitalize on the opportunity that new Turkish operation would present. Some within the movement have been actively tempering expectations in closed online discussions, encouraging fellow supporters not to rush into a new campaign without instruction from their leadership. These figures argue that Turkish airstrikes alone would not be enough to make a tangible operational difference on the ground and that talk of a Turkish ground invasion may still be unrealistic.

75-Turkish opposition to ISIS means it can’t reconstitute itself

What’s more, there is no love lost between Ankara and the Islamic State. Their enmity is well-known and deeply entrenched, especially following the Turkish-led Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016 and 2017, which saw the Islamic State ultimately burning several Turkish soldiers alive on film. This means that even if Erdogan were to launch a ground invasion and critically undermine the Syrian Democratic Forces, the residual networks of the “caliphate” would not suddenly find themselves operating in friendly territory.

On that basis, many of these calls for restraint have been aimed at managing the hopes of Islamic State supporters held in Syrian Democratic Forces-run detention facilities in the northeast, as well as the al-Hol, and to a more limited extent Roj, camps. Since 2019, Islamic State leaders have repeatedly stated that their priority in Syria is the liberation of detained supporters in the northeast. Indeed, in every strategic statement since the military defeat of the “caliphate” at Baghuz in March 2019, this has been a core theme.

74-Resolving Nagorno-Karabak requires putting pressure on Turkey

Yeghia Tashjian is a regional analyst and researcher. He has graduated from the American University of Beirut in Public Policy and International Affairs. He pursued his BA at Haigazian University in political science in 2013, 12-22, 22, The Armenian Weekly, https://armenianweekly.com/2022/12/22/beyond-the-blocking-of-the-lachin-corridor/, Beyond the Blocking of the Lachin Corridor

The blockade of the Lachin Corridor should not come as a surprise to us as such scenarios were already discussed in Azerbaijani media. The only surprise has been Russia’s inability to solve the crisis. Weeks ago, Turkey’s defense minister Hulusi Akar, during joint military drills with Azerbaijan near the Iranian border, called on Armenia to “grasp the opportunity and respond positively to Turkey’s and Azerbaijan’s peace calls.” Commenting on the so-called “Zangezur corridor” Akar said, “It is our sincerest wish to re-establish the railway and connections in the region, especially the opening of the Zangezur corridor, to start economic activities, and to ensure a comprehensive normalization throughout the region, including the relations between Azerbaijan-Armenia and Turkey-Armenia.” The Turkish defense minister said that Turkey will vow to continue supporting Azerbaijan’s “righteous cause” against Armenia.CONTINUES: It is important to remind readers that Azerbaijan once again has invited the Turkish F-16 fighters. This is a clear message to Yerevan and Moscow that Baku is ready for the escalation. Hence, Baku is pressuring Moscow to renegotiate the terms of the November 10, 2020 trilateral statement. Meanwhile, Turkey is also sending a signal to Moscow via Baku that Azerbaijan is a “red line” for Turkey, and Ankara will protect its interests in the South Caucasus as it did in 2020.

73-Azerbaijan is already deterred by the threat of US sanctions

Is Azerbaijan ready to take a risk and ask for the removal of Russian peacekeeping forces and their replacement with international peacekeeping forces? According to several Azerbaijani experts, currently, Baku is against the withdrawal of Russian forces by force since the annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh and the ethnic cleansing of Armenians will tarnish President Ilham Aliyev’s image in the West. Azerbaijan fears that such an action would force the EU and the US to impose economic sanctions. For now, Baku prefers to see the Russians staying, but under control. For Azerbaijan, as one of the experts claimed, it is much easier to deal with a weak Russia, rather than with Europeans. That’s because Baku is familiar with the “Russian mentality.” Hinting at the Russians, one Azerbaijani expert said “a microbe when it is in full shape – is highly dangerous, but once you destroy the microbe to its half capacity, it turns into a vaccine.” Baku prefers a weak and “good microbe” that can boost Azerbaijan’s immunity and consolidate Aliyev’s grip over the Azerbaijanis.

72-Relations non-unique: oil production cut

Cause, January/February 2023, F. GREGORY GAUSE III is Professor of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and a Faculty Affiliate at the Bush School’s Albritton Center for Grand Strategy, Foreign Affairs, The Kingdom and the Power: How to Salvage the U.S.-Saudi Relationship, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/gregory-gause-kingdom-and-power-us-saudi-relationship

In October 2022, Saudi Arabia announced that OPEC+, a group of oil-exporting countries, would cut oil production targets substantially: by two million barrels per day. As the world’s top exporter of oil, the Saudis have always taken the lead in the group’s efforts to manage the world oil market. The move had an immediate if relatively modest impact on oil prices, which rose from a low for the year of around $76 per barrel before the announcement to a range of about $82 to $91 by mid-November. The shock felt by Americans was more geopolitical than economic: the Biden administration had asked Saudi Arabia to delay the cut. But Riyadh went ahead with it anyway, snubbing Washington.

The resulting recriminations between Washington and Riyadh have called into question the future of the bilateral relationship. In response to the OPEC+ decision, the Biden administration announced that it would reevaluate its relationship with Saudi Arabia and said the cuts “would increase Russian revenues and blunt the effectiveness of sanctions” introduced in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Robert Menendez, a Democratic senator from New Jersey, vowed to block arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Several members of Congress introduced a bill mandating the removal of U.S. troops from the kingdom. Riyadh refused to backtrack, saying the OPEC+ decision was unanimous and based “purely on economic reasons.”

71-Biden’s visit made relations with Saudi Arabia worse

The war in Ukraine and the subsequent surge in oil prices caused the administration to reconsider. Isolating the Saudis was feasible during the drop in world oil demand during the COVID-19 pandemic. But when the United States tried to cut off Russian oil exports as the world economy and oil demand began to recover, Washington needed Saudi Arabia. Riyadh was one of the few actors that could pump more oil immediately. Yet Biden’s trip to Saudi Arabia accomplished little and generated even more bad feelings. The Saudis resented the U.S. contention that Biden had come not to meet the crown prince but rather to attend a multilateral meeting with the Gulf Cooperation Council states. The two sides feuded in public over whether Biden brought up the Khashoggi case during a private conversation with MBS; Biden said he had, and the Saudis said he had not. A meeting meant to smooth relations only ruffled them further.

70-Despite differences, the US and Saudi Arabia have a mutual interest in continuing to cooperate

Despite their differences over oil prices, the two countries’ economic interests still overlap in important ways. They share an interest in maintaining the dominance of the U.S. dollar. Riyadh prices its oil in dollars, which buttresses the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency because oil consumers must have dollars on hand to fund their energy needs. Unfriendly oil producers such as Iran, Venezuela, and Russia occasionally push to conduct transactions in alternative currencies. Saudi Arabia has always resisted such overtures, because anything that damages the dollar’s centrality reduces the value of Saudi Arabia’s dollar-denominated assets, which is significant given the volume of Saudi financial assets in U.S. markets, including substantial holdings of U.S. government debt, and investments in U.S. companies.

Finally, it is in the interest of both the United States and Saudi Arabia to continue to cooperate on military and intelligence issues. For Saudi Arabia, neither China nor Russia can provide the level of security cooperation that the United States can. Only Washington can project substantial military power into the Persian Gulf region, as demonstrated during the Gulf War of 1990–91. And the United States benefits from cooperation, too. Saudi arms purchases reduce the unit costs of U.S. arms production and link the two states’ militaries, fostering long-term partnership. With the likely failure of the nuclear talks with Tehran, the chance of a confrontation between the United States and Iran grows. Cooperation with Saudi Arabia on military contingencies increases the military efficiency of the United States in the region, thereby deterring Iran.

69-Saudi Arabia will inevitably cooperate with the US on Iran – It’s in their own interest

Another point of tension with Riyadh that suddenly seems less salient is Washington’s effort to curtail Iran’s nuclear activities through diplomacy, which the Saudis worried would entail concessions to Iran that would solidify Tehran’s regional influence. It seems likely that efforts to revive the Iran nuclear deal, which Trump pulled out of in 2018, will fail. Washington will inevitably have to find a new policy to deter or prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons while also limiting or rolling back Iranian influence in the region. Saudi Arabia has the same interest.

68-Saudi-US relations resilient

The resulting recriminations between Washington and Riyadh have called into question the future of the bilateral relationship. In response to the OPEC+ decision, the Biden administration announced that it would reevaluate its relationship with Saudi Arabia and said the cuts “would increase Russian revenues and blunt the effectiveness of sanctions” introduced in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Robert Menendez, a Democratic senator from New Jersey, vowed to block arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Several members of Congress introduced a bill mandating the removal of U.S. troops from the kingdom. Riyadh refused to backtrack, saying the OPEC+ decision was unanimous and based “purely on economic reasons.”

In the intervening months, tempers on both sides have cooled, and it seems unlikely that the Biden administration’s promised reevaluation of ties with Saudi Arabia will lead to a major change. U.S.-Saudi relations have weathered worse crises. And in November 2022, the Biden administration granted sovereign immunity to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS, on the basis of his role as Saudi Arabia’s prime minister, in a U.S. civil case brought against him by the fiancée of Jamal Khashoggi, a journalist murdered at the hands of Saudi operatives. The immunity is one sign, among many others, that the U.S.-Saudi relationship is not headed for rupture. But the OPEC+ imbroglio and its aftermath signal the arrival of a new phase in the relationship. For the first time since the mid-twentieth century, when the relationship began, Riyadh is not on board with Washington’s grand strategy.

67-US has no influence with Saudi Arabia

First, the global balance of power has shifted. Washington’s relative influence is waning as the international order becomes multipolar, making moderately powerful countries such as Saudi Arabia more likely to hedge their bets and less likely to throw in their lot with just one great power.

66-Relations with Saudi Arabia are necessary to protect US interests

For those who believe that U.S. foreign policy should privilege human rights and shun fossil fuels, the fraying U.S.-Saudi relationship poses no problem. But even the Biden administration, which entered office happy to distance itself from Riyadh, quickly came around to the need for a working relationship with the world’s largest oil exporter. No matter how committed the United States is to adopting clean energy, oil will be needed during the transition. No matter how badly Americans want to pivot away from the Middle East, Washington has geopolitical commitments in the region that draw the United States back in: keeping Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, preventing a resurgence of jihadism, maintaining regional stability to reduce refugee pressures on Europe, and sustaining the relationship with Israel. If oil and the Middle East remain even marginally important for U.S. interests, a working relationship with Saudi Arabia is necessary.

65-Israel-Arab relations strong now

On the big issues in the Middle East, Washington and Riyadh are not that far apart. The traditional stumbling block, the close U.S.-Israeli relationship, is no longer an obstacle, thanks to warming Saudi-Israeli relations. The Saudis are increasingly willing to work with Israel, even if they are not yet ready to follow Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates into the so-called Abraham Accords, through which those countries have normalized their relations with Israel.

64-There is no alternative to MBS for the US to deal with

On the U.S. side, Democrats should accept the fact that MBS will very likely be the next king of Saudi Arabia and will rule for a long time. It makes no sense to try to isolate him or work around him. This might be distasteful for advocates of human rights, but if U.S. diplomats and officials can deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and many other governments that violate the human rights of their citizens and others, they can certainly meet with MBS.

63-Diplomacy needed to prevent Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict escalation

Tmnecky, 12-22, 22, Mark Temnycky is an accredited freelance journalist covering Eastern Europe and a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/armenian-azerbaijani-conflict-about-escalate-206045

Aliyev’s outbursts may have been strategic. Days after calling off the peace negotiations, Azerbaijani officials reportedly blocked off the Lachin Corridor, the only passage that connects Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. According to Armenian reports, over 120,000 people were cut off from Armenia for several hours due to this “blockade.” Azerbaijani officials have alleged that Armenia is using the corridor to sneak military hardware into the region, an accusation that Armenian officials deny.

Amid the delays in negotiations, the Armenians are now concerned that Azerbaijan is trying to take control of Nagorno-Karabakh by force. The Armenians previously stated that they would withdraw their troops from the region by September. Armenia also told residents to leave the area, but tens of thousands of ethnic Armenians continue to reside there. In addition, the International Court of Justice and the United Nations are still reviewing claims submitted by the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments.

Given the delays in these various matters, Azerbaijani authorities are becoming impatient. Instead, they may try to take matters into their own hands. Russia, which currently has peacekeepers in the region, has become preoccupied with its illegal and unnecessary war in Ukraine. As a result of Russia’s waning influence in the region, Turkey has become the main intermediary. But it is facing its own problems as it combats soaring inflation while also trying to balance its collapsing currency. With two of the region’s biggest powers dealing with their own affairs, Armenia and Azerbaijan are left to fend for themselves as they try to resolve their differences.

Armenian officials now report that residents in Nagorno-Karabakh have been cut off from gas and other necessities. The European Union has expressed its concerns about the situation, highlighting that it does not have a presence in the region, which makes assessing the situation more complicated. Still, the EU is actively trying to engage with Armenian and Azerbaijani officials to de-escalate recent developments in the region.

Overall, the recent escalations in Nagorno-Karabakh are a result of missed opportunities. The conflict has flared and subsided throughout the year. Armenian and Azerbaijani officials have met on numerous occasions, but little action has been taken to resolve the conflict. Instead, the current ceasefire has been violated, additional lives have been lost, and Armenian and Azerbaijani officials and citizens are frustrated by the never-ending conflict.

As we enter 2023, one New Year’s resolution should be for the world to help mediate the conflict and finally convince Armenia and Azerbaijan to sign a peace treaty to end the war. Doing so will spare thousands of lives from additional hardship. But if the conflict continues to drag on, and if officials from both sides are not held accountable, the risk of a deadlier conflict will only grow. It is time for peace.

62-Saudi Arabia currently wants to maintain relations with the US

Salem Alketebi, 12-22, 22, UAE political analyst and former Federal National Council candidate, Jerusalem Post, A new geostrategic reality: Saudi Arabia’s growing role, https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-725504

Saudi Arabia is aware of the enormous consequences of not valuing the price of its oil exports to China in dollars, as well as the link to the global influence of the US, mainly related to the strength of the American currency and its impact on the global economy. The Chinese president’s visit to Saudi Arabia strengthens Saudi Arabia’s role and influence and reflects the kingdom’s prestige.

However, this does not necessarily mean a breakdown in relations between Riyadh and Washington, especially in the security and military sphere. There remains evidence that Saudi Arabia wants to maintain its alliance with the US but under new rules of the game that reflect changes in the international environment and the Saudi vision of the relationship.

61-17 million Yemenis face food insecurity

USAID, 12-22, 22, https://www.usaid.gov/humanitarian-assistance/yemen, Yemen

Relief actors reported nearly 700 access incidents in Yemen between July and September, which delayed or interrupted the delivery of humanitarian assistance to more than 5.8 million people, according to the UN. Nearly 17 million people in Yemen—more than 53 percent of the population—will likely experience Crisis—IPC 3—or worse levels of acute food insecurity between October and December 2022, according to an updated IPC analysis released in November. Through USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance, the U.S. Government will provide up to $20 million in humanitarian assistance funding to support the UN World Food Program in transporting grain donated by the Government of Ukraine to assist food-insecure people in Yemen.

60-Armenia-Azerbaijan war risks increasing, need diplomacy

Rellief Web, 12-21, 22, https://reliefweb.int/report/armenia/despite-glimmer-hope-armenia-azerbaijan-conflict-escalating-tensions-threaten-derail-fragile-progress-senior-official-tells-security-council, Despite ‘Glimmer of Hope’ in Armenia, Azerbaijan Conflict, Escalating Tensions Threaten to Derail Fragile Progress, Senior Official Tells Security Council

Despite a “glimmer of hope” regarding diplomatic efforts by Armenia and Azerbaijan towards a resolution of their ongoing dispute, a current escalation of tension and incidents threatens to derail fragile progress and unleash a dangerous resumption of violence, a senior United Nations official told the Security Council today. Miroslav Jenča, Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and Americas, Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, noted that since his last briefing, the parties have regularly traded accusations of ceasefire violations. Following renewed violence in mid-September, there have been several high-level diplomatic initiatives — including a meeting in October between Nikol Pashinyan, Prime Minister of Armenia, and Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan, in Prague, resulting in an agreement to deploy the European Union monitoring capacity in Armenia. He further recalled that in late October, leaders of the country met again in Sochi, hosted by Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, where they agreed to refrain from use or threat of force.In addition to the European Union mission agreed on by both sides, the Organization for Security and Co‑operation in Europe (OSCE), as well as the Collective Security Treaty Organization — at the request of Armenia — have also deployed missions to Armenia. Regrettably, he noted that tensions on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and around areas under control of Russian Federation peacekeeping forces have not abated.While representatives of both Armenia and Azerbaijan have provided widely differing accounts of the situation and accused each other of violating the 9 November 2020 trilateral statement, he underscored that the potential human toll of resumed conflict could be considerable. It would not only impact people of Armenia and Azerbaijan, but the wider South Caucasus region and beyond, he said, urging the parties to redouble efforts for a negotiated peaceful settlement before it is too late. In the ensuing debate, Member States called for calm and diplomacy, expressing concern over the Lachin Corridor situation, while the representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan exchanged charges that the other side is continuing provocations and has violated the trilateral statement. The representative of Armenia said that the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is close to turning into a humanitarian catastrophe.Negotiations by the region’s authorities with the Azerbaijani side to restore the Lachin Corridor’s safe and unhindered operation have not yielded results.That country’s unabated provocations have shown that, without strong accountability measures including sanctions, it will continue to test the determination of the international community and the Council

59-Russia can best resolve Nagorno-Karabakh

Edith Lederer, 12-21, 22, Yahoo News, UN official warns against new Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, https://www.yahoo.com/now/un-official-warns-against-armenia-060556214.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAC0HKGKFEM5JBPi0NOQ41Ix5H8oZkyLBZOWs7qrzj0pCGmFhfFL7wSmHdQAo0ISFGV6n-wl8VHLtAM83Y7sibkvpo3KBBN7I2mfHlh4rkG4J248IQ2QQBlveMTqvIECy7_D64fuGcz3-ICFplt9tm6337xV0M1Ko9pWUy7oay9M0

The former Soviet countries have been locked in a decades-old conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, which is part of Azerbaijan but has been under the control of ethnic Armenian forces backed by Armenia since a separatist war there ended in 1994. During a six-week war in 2020, Azerbaijan reclaimed broad swaths of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent territories held by Armenian forces. More than 6,700 people died in the fighting that was ended by a Russia-brokered peace agreement. Jenča said there has been “a glimmer of hope” for progress in ongoing diplomatic efforts following renewed violence in mid-September that killed 155 soldiers from both countries. But regrettably, he said, tensions on the border and around areas put under control of Russian peacekeeping forces in the 2020 peace agreement “have not abated as hoped.”

58-Russia brokered the last deal and has peacekeepers in the region

AA World, 12-21, 22, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/azerbaijan-armenia-trade-barbs-at-un-over-lachin-corridor-to-karabakh-region/2768809, Azerbaijan, Armenia trade barbs at UN over Lachin corridor to Karabakh region

Relations between the two former Soviet republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan have been tense since 1991, when the Armenian military occupied Nagorno-Karabakh, a territory internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, and seven adjacent regions. In the fall of 2020, in 44 days of fighting, Azerbaijan liberated several cities, villages and settlements from Armenian occupation. The Russian-brokered peace agreement is celebrated as a triumph in Azerbaijan.

Since then, Russian peacekeeping troops have been deployed in the region.

57-Shelling on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border

JAM News, 12-20, 22, “Azerbaijan creating pretexts for the resumption of war.” Opinion from Yerevan, https://jam-news.net/probability-of-an-armenia-azerbaijan-war/

In parallel with the blocking of the Lachin corridor in Armenia, the Armenian Defense Ministry reports that after midnight, Azerbaijani units opened fire in the direction of Armenian positions near the village of Kutakan, Gegharkunik region. Meanwhile, Baku has been regularly accusing Armenia of shelling Azerbaijani positions in the eastern direction of the border. All such reports from Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan are immediately followed by denial from the Armenian side. According to political scientist Gurgen Simonyan, Baku is trying to create the impression that “Azerbaijan is being subjected to aggression by Armenia, so they take retaliatory steps.” “Baku trying to legitimize ‘new regime’ in the Lachin corridor.” Opinion from Yerevan Gas supply restored, road still blocked: situation in NK “The silence of friendly countries seems strange” – Pashinyan on situation in Lachin According to the Armenian Ministry of Defense, on December 20 at about 00:05 units of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces opened fire in the direction of Armenian positions located near the village of Kutakan: “There are no losses on the Armenian side. As of 09:00, the situation on the front line is relatively stable.” On December 15 the Armenian Defense Ministry also reported on shelling from the Azerbaijani side. Then it was reported that the Azerbaijani military opened fire from small arms of various calibers in the direction of the villages of Norabak (Gegharkunik region) and Srashen (Syunik region). Almost daily last week there were reports from Baku that the Armenian military was shelling Azerbaijani positions in the eastern, northeastern and southeastern sections of the border.

56-CSTO solves Armenia-Russia conflict

Bruc Eruguyur, 12-19, 22, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/russian-led-bloc-to-send-mission-to-baku-yerevan-border-if-armenia-deems-necessary-official/2767716,

Russian-led bloc to send mission to Baku-Yerevan border if Armenia deems necessary: Official

The Collective Security Treaty Organization’s (CSTO) proposals to send a mission to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border remain should Yerevan deem it necessary, the former head of the Russian-led bloc said on Monday. “As for the direction of the CSTO mission – those proposals to provide assistance to the Republic of Armenia – one of the points was the direction of the CSTO mission to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border … This remains in force. If Armenia considers it necessary either to make a decision on the entire package of measures or on individual points, this can be implemented,” Stanislav Zas said during a press conference. Saying that the heads of CSTO member states met three times in 2022 to discuss the situation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, Zas noted that the CSTO is not going to turn away from Armenia. “As for the intentions of the CSTO to leave Armenia or somehow turn away from it: of course not,” Zas said.iplomacy

55-US diplomacy stopped Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict in the past

Bruc Eruguyur, 12-19, 22, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/russian-led-bloc-to-send-mission-to-baku-yerevan-border-if-armenia-deems-necessary-official/2767716,

Russian-led bloc to send mission to Baku-Yerevan border if Armenia deems necessary: Official It was five minutes past midnight and Lilit was praying by the window of her apartment in Jermuk, a resort famous for its mineral water and spas in southern Armenia. Suddenly, enormous, orange balls of fire lit up the sky. “This is it,” she said aloud to herself. “The war has begun.” The blitzkrieg attack by Azerbaijan in the early minutes of September 13, 2022 left at least 6 civilians and 200 Armenian soldiers dead in two days of fighting, which stopped after the prompt diplomatic intervention by the US State Department and, according to Russian President Vladimir Putin, his government too.

54-Armenia-Azerbaijan war coming in the spring

Bruc Eruguyur, 12-19, 22, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/russian-led-bloc-to-send-mission-to-baku-yerevan-border-if-armenia-deems-necessary-official/2767716,

In Jermuk, Lilit was visiting her neighbor, Maryam. The two women were among the very few residents — perhaps a dozen or two — who decided to stay in the city of 6,000 after the civilians were evacuated during the two days of fighting. Maryam, a widow and the mother and grandmother of soldiers serving in the Armenian army, has seen war on and off since independence in 1991. Her son, who fought in the 44-day Nagorno Karabakh war, returned unharmed from fighting yet with a memory that has been haunting him from the first day of combat in Jabrayil, now a ghost town captured by the Azerbaijani forces in 2020. “Just as they were emerging from their hideout, he saw the car in which his four friends had just got into go up in flames,” possibly struck by a drone. Analyst Benyamin Poghosyan believes a new war is in the making, saying it may happen by the end of 2022 or March-April 2023. “Any timeframe is based on perceptions, misperceptions, and speculation, but Azerbaijan is preparing for war.”

53-Diplomacy won’t stop Azerbaijan aggression

Avedis Hadjian, 12-20, 22, The Spectator, As the Post-Soviet Order Collapses, Azerbaijan Tests New Ways to Pressure Armenia, https://mirrorspectator.com/2022/12/20/as-the-post-soviet-order-collapses-azerbaijan-tests-new-ways-to-pressure-armenia/

In the circumstances, the prospects of a peace treaty that would put an end to conflict in the region are dim at best. CivilNet’s analyst Eric Hacopian says that as long as the military balance is not addressed, peace cannot be assured. “Unfortunately, so much of the political legitimacy of the regime in Baku comes from aggression,” he said. “The other thing about a piece of paper is that no matter what they say, the heart of the argument is Artsakh, and there’s an 800-pound gorilla in the room and it’s Russia — they can blow up any agreement: we have no idea what they will do or what condition that country will be in six months from now or two years from now or three days from now.” But signing anything doesn’t mean anything, he said. “The moment you say you sign and say we accept each other’s borders, and the next day something happens in Artsakh and any Armenian government says something, [Azerbaijan] will say ‘you are violating the agreement, you are interfering in our internal rights, we are going to fight revanchism.” Defense expert Nerses Kopalyan, political science professor at the University of Nevada, advocates the “military porcupine” doctrine, the one underpinning Taiwan’s deterrence architecture. In the face of such an imbalance of military power, Armenia should become extremely costly to defeat. “The time has come for Armenia to reconfigure its security architecture as it exists now, as opposed to these grand understandings that Russia will come to our rescue and the continuous reliance on Russia,” Kopalyan said.

52-Iran destabilizing Nabarno Karak

Valiyev, 12-18, 22, Dr. Cavid Veliyev is Head of Department of the Center of Analysis of International Relations, Is Iran Seeking a New Proxy War in the South Caucasus?, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/iran-seeking-new-proxy-war-south-caucasus-206030

A New Front in the Caucuses Tehran, which thinks that the geopolitical balance in the region has changed against its interests after the Second Karabakh War, seems to have pushed diplomacy and cooperation into the background, especially over the past two years, and has instead brought military plans to the fore. The IRGC, which is especially active in the Middle East, is trying to achieve comparable effectiveness in the South Caucasus region. In August, the IRGC confirmed that it was conducting a joint drone exercise with the armies of Russia, Armenia, and Belarus at Kashan Air Base. Revolutionary Guard Aerospace General Ali Babali reported that the exercises, held within the framework of the 7th UAV competition, lasted for two weeks. Seventy personnel from four countries participated in this exercise. It was later revealed that UAVs supplied to Russia from Iran were used in the Ukraine war. Further on, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard held military exercises along the Araz river on the border with Azerbaijan. This exercise, codenamed “IRGC Ground Force’s Might,” covered the East Azerbaijan and Ardabil regions. Mock heliborne parachute operations, night raids, helicopter combat operations, and suicide drone operations were carried out during the first day of the exercises. Construction of a temporary bridge over the Aras River that separates Iran from Azerbaijan and Armenia, seizure and control of supply roads and heights, and offensive, as well as destructive operations against designated targets, constituted other parts of the drills. After the IRGC’s exercises, on October 20, Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian visited Armenia as the head of a delegation. During his visit, Abdullahian participated in the opening of the Kafan consulate, where he said that “the security of Armenia is our security.” A few weeks later, the former ambassador of Iran in Azerbaijan, Mohsin Pakain, said that these exercises were aimed at protecting Armenia against Azerbaijan. Former Commander of the IRGC and top military aide to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Yahia Rahim Safavi, stated on October 18 that twenty-two countries in total, including Armenia, had submitted official requests to purchase Iranian-made UAVs. After this, it was revealed that twenty-seven Iranian citizens went to Karabakh, which is Azerbaijani territory, between November 26 and 30. Azerbaijani political activists appealed to Iran’s Baku embassy to make a statement about this unauthorized visit. As the Iranian embassy did not respond, the Azerbaijani press put out the news that Iran had supplied 500 Dehlavieh and 100 Almas missiles to Armenia. These missiles were previously seen in Yemen and Libya, but were intercepted before reaching non-state actors there. It was reported that these missiles were supplied to Armenia by the Al-Kuds branch of the IRGC, which is the organization’s de facto “manager” of Iran’s proxy wars in the Middle East. At the same time, Tehran maintains support for proxy groups of pro-Iranian Azerbaijani citizens. Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev demanded in April of this year the extradition of twenty-two Azerbaijani citizens who were officially operating in Iran against Azerbaijan under the name of Huseyyniyun, which was created and supported by the IRGC Quds Force. Then, in August, the prosecutor general of Azerbaijan visited Iran and presented his counterpart with a list prepared by Azerbaijani law enforcement agencies. It is reported that this list includes persons who make threats against the state structure of Azerbaijan. To this day, however, Iran has yet to extradite these people, and Iranian officials have indirectly made it known that they will never be deported to Azerbaijan. Iranian officials, including former diplomats and experts, claim that, after the Second Karabakh War, the effectiveness of NATO, the EU, and Israel in the South Caucasus has increased, through Azerbaijan in particular. Iranian authorities, seeking to counter this supposed situational change, have openly declared that they will not allow such to continue, and are considering arming Armenia, training and arming the separatists in Karabakh for proxy warfare, and supporting pro-Iranian groups in Azerbaijan as a solution. Russia is also involved, for it allows Iranian personnel to enter the Karabakh region illegally. All this only serves to further destabilize the South Caucasus, at a time when the region is of increasing importance to global energy security, supply chain diversification, and more.

51-Turkey wants Russian mediation [not US mediation]

Modern News, 12-17, 22, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/12/17/erdogan-proposed-trilateral-mechanism-with-russia-and-syria/, Erdogan proposed trilateral mechanism with Russia and Syria

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (photo) said he proposed to his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin establishing a trilateral mechanism with Russia and Syria and to hold a leaders meeting, primarily for discussions on the security issues. “As of now, we want to take a step as Syria-Türkiye-Russia trio,” Erdoğan told journalists. “First our intelligence agencies, then defense ministers, and then foreign ministers could meet. After their meetings, we as the leaders, may come together. I also offered this to Mr. Putin. He also viewed it positively. Thus, we will start a series of negotiations,” he added. Erdoğan earlier said he had not ruled out a meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, although the two countries have been regional foes since the civil war broke out in Syria in 2011. Erdoğan emphasized that the terror threat posed by the YPG (a militia in Syria made up of Kurdish community fighters) from Syria is “another issue that needs to be taken quickly.” “Terrorist organizations must not rest comfortably in Syria, especially in northern Syria. From time to time, they threaten and provoke our country from there, they do everything,” he said.

50-Russia supports Turkey’s request

Arab News, 12-17, 22, Moscow welcomes Turkiye’s call for trilateral Syria diplomacy, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2217256/middle-east

Moscow on Friday welcomed Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan’s proposal to establish a three-way mechanism for diplomacy between Turkey, Russia and Syria, Russian state news agencies reported, citing a deputy foreign minister. The RIA Novosti news agency also reported that Syria’s position on the idea – which could involve a summit between the leaders of the three countries – was not yet known, but that Moscow was in contact with officials in Damascus.

49-Turkey doesn’t trust the US

Fillis, 12-16, 22, Constantinos Filis is the director of the Institute of Global Affairs and associate professor at the American College of Greece. A new book in Greek titled “The Future of History,” edited by Filis, is currently in stores, The West hypnotized by Erdogan, https://www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/1200306/the-west-hypnotized-by-erdogan/

For months now, tough negotiations have being under way between Turkey and the United States in an atmosphere of mutual mistrust but also of mutual understanding that a rupture in their relations is not in the interest of either party. The fact that Turkey is about to enter an election year, the difficulties faced by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan mainly due to the state of the economy, and his need to win the elections at all costs create problems as well as limitations in their consultations.

The problems exist because Ankara is irked about Washington’s actions which it considers to be demonstrably against Turkey’s interests. This is intensified by the belief that Americans don’t like Erdogan – hence the alleged attempt to “get rid of him” with the failed coup in 2016 – and that the US continues to undermine him by supporting the Syrian Kurds and a change of policy in relation to Greece. In Erdogan’s domestic narrative, the US is usually demonized and accused of attempting to destabilize the regime in order to rally a mainly nationalist audience and justify a departure from Western norms.

Besides, Erdogan does not want to be held captive to the decisions and choices of third parties, and because of the war in Ukraine he is trying to a gain a greater degree of flexibility, even in aggressive actions such as those against the Syrian Kurds. He also wants to be allowed to lash out against Greece without cost, cultivating an anti-Greek climate in his country, embellishing the agenda of Turkish claims, burdening relations with a country that is supposed to be an ally, and threatening to “come suddenly one night.”

48-Turkey wants to launch an incursion into Syria against US-backed forces

RFI, 12-17, 22, https://www.rfi.fr/en/podcasts/international-report/20221217-turkish-military-incursion-in-syria-faces-opposition-from-us-russia, Turkish military incursion in Syria faces opposition from US, Russia

Turkish military forces are poised to launch a ground offensive in Syria against US-backed Syrian Kurdish forces, accused by Ankara of attacks on Turkey. But Ankara is facing stiff opposition from both Washington and Moscow. Turkish security forces blame the Syrian Kurdish YPG for carrying out a series of recent attacks against Turkey, including in Istanbul, a charge the group denies. The Turkish Defense Ministry said Sunday that Turkey launched deadly airstrikes over northern regions of Syria and Iraq, targeting Kurdish groups that Ankara holds responsible for last month’s deadly bomb attack in a bustling street in Istanbul. Ankara also accuses them of being linked to PKK insurgents fighting in Turkey.

47- Armenia shelling Azerbaijan

Azer News, 12-18, 22, https://www.azernews.az/nation/203740.html, Armenia shells Azerbaijani positions in Kalbajar & Tovuz directions of border

On December 16, starting from 1200 to 1350 local time, using various calibers of weapons, units of the Armenian armed forces stationed in the direction of Musurskand of Tovuzgala (Tavush) region and Yukhari Shorzha (Verin Shorzha) settlement of Basarkechar (Gekharkunik) region shelled positions of the Azerbaijani army in Aghdam settlement of Tovuz and Zaylik settlement of Kalbajar districts, Azernews reports per Defense Ministry. Moreover, members of the illegal armed formations in Karabakh, where the Russian peacekeepers are temporarily stationed, periodically subjected to fire the Azerbaijan army positions stationed in the direction of Khojavand District at 1305 local time on December 16.

46-Russia can’t stop Azerbaijan from being aggressive

Haoyu “Henry” Huang, 12-17, 22, Modern Diplomacy, Russia Incapable in Facilitating Armenia-Azerbaijan Talks, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/12/17/russia-incapable-in-facilitating-armenia-azerbaijan-talks/

Moscow still sees itself as a critical player in the Caucasus region. The ongoing crisis between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Karabakh region allows Russia to participate in Caucasus affairs. Moscow organized Sochi Summit for Baku and Yerevan for direct talks. The ongoing crisis in the Caucasus has also become a hot topic at the CSTO summit. Russia seems to remain an influential power and a peace mediator for the Caucasus.

However, Russia’s desire to become the peace broker in the outer Caucasus region is merely a fantasy. Due to the ongoing Ukrainian war, Russia lacks the power to project and credibility. Armenia, a close ally of Moscow, is also slowly distancing itself from Moscow, thus making Russia’s vision even harder to achieve. Furthermore, the outside powers, especially Turkey, have grown significantly more substantial, further eroding Russia’s influences in the region and, therefore, the chances of facilitating peace talks.

The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war has gone far beyond the expectation of Moscow. While Ukrainians bravely defend their homeland, Russia’s seemingly almighty war machine is deep in a predicament. Moscow calling for partial mobilization further reveals its dire situation. Russia’s military failure also shook the foundation of Russia’s power projection, as the world now sees Russia as weaker than ever before. The recent incident of Azerbaijani blocking the road towards Karabakh is a vital sign that Russia is losing its grip over the Karabakh region.

To make matters worse, Russia’s military actions in Ukraine also triggered a diplomatic tsunami. Putin’s speech alerted all the former Soviet countries, further depleting Russian credibility. Meanwhile, the war diverted essential resources and ruined the formidable image of Russian troops. Azerbaijanis are now taking more aggressive actions in Karabakh after the war, while Karabakh residents have already questioned the effectiveness of Russian peacekeeping forces even before the war. On all fronts, Moscow’s credibility in mediating peace has eroded.

45-Armenia wants US support to resolve the Karabkah issues

At the same time, Armenia has also been seeking outside support beyond Russia. The visit of Speaker Pelosi of the US has given Armenians hope that the country could be supported by outside powers other than Russia. Yerevan has also tried to seek rapprochement with Turkey, a historical adversary. Armenia was invited to the Antalya Security Conference, and the Foreign Minister of both countries met and discussed normalizing the relationship. These are all clear signs that Armenia seeks other sources to solve the long-lasting Karabakh issues, thus making Russia’s presence less relevant.

44-A Turkish incursion into Syria undermines the war against ISIS

The Hindu, 12-17, 22, Dangerous gamble: On Turkey’s attacks on Syrian Kurds, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/dangerous-gamble-the-hindu-editorial-on-turkeys-attacks-on-syrian-kurds/article66271141.ece

Turkey has carried out several incursions in the past into Syria, gobbling up territories now manned by the Syrian National Army, a rebel umbrella group that is opposed to Damascus and backed by Ankara. But, Turkey had also come under pressure from the U.S., its NATO partner that backs a YPG-led militia group, and Russia, an ally of the Syrian regime, which placed constraints on its operations. However, Russia’s Ukraine war seems to have altered the geopolitical reality in the region in Turkey’s favour. A preoccupied Russia would not like to antagonise Turkey, which despite being a NATO member has not joined the U.S.-led sanctions, and the U.S. would want Ankara’s support for the inclusion of Sweden and Finland into NATO. This opens space for Mr. Erdoğan to up the ante in Syria. But this could be a dangerous bet. The IS had captured most of these border towns in 2014-15. The YPG, with U.S. help, had fought hard against the IS to liberate the region. Now under attack, the YPG has already said it would end patrolling of many towns on the border. A Turkish incursion could trigger further chaos, which could help Islamist militants to regroup and push the Kurdish population, already victims of years of wars, into further misery

43-Turn: Diplomacy has brought the Houthis more time to increase aggression

Zimmerman, 12-16, 22, The Hill, Katherine Zimmerman is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and advises AEI’s Critical Threats Project, Congress missed an opportunity to ask the right questions on Yemen, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3772765-congress-missed-an-opportunity-to-ask-the-right-questions-on-yemen/

The Biden administration has leaned heavily into diplomacy to help end Yemen’s war. Stopping the fighting to set conditions for the United Nations to negotiate a resolution have been key aims. U.S. efforts were key to the diplomatic breakthrough in April that yielded a UN-brokered truce, but that truce has only bought the Houthis time to further consolidate power in northeast Yemen. Moreover, while they have extracted concessions, the Houthis have yet to follow through on terms to which they agreed. Still, UN and U.S. officials continue to hope that they can translate ongoing talks into a viable resolution to the conflict. What no one has articulated is how negotiations today, when the Houthis have the upper hand, would lead to any semblance of an acceptable resolution for the Yemeni people and for U.S. interests.

42-US has no leverage over the Houthis to get them to stop fighting

What sources of leverage short of armed force does the U.S. hold over the Houthis to encourage them to negotiate in good faith? The Houthis remain empowered in Yemen, allowing them to make maximalist demands. They are militarily strong. Even should Iran stop supplying the Houthis with weapons — and there are no signs of this occurring — the Houthis have an enormous stockpile, which Iran continued to add to during the six-month truce period, that ensures they can carry on their fight. The Houthis are further emboldened by messaging from Congress against Saudi Arabia and mixed signals from the international community demanding they back down from their current positions but criticizing any resumption of fighting that might weaken the Houthis. Sanctions have had little impact, as have public exhortations for the Houthis to make necessary concessions for peace.

41-It’s in the US national interest to end the war in Yemen because it will disrupt shipping

Yemen’s conflict is complex and mostly out of the news, making it difficult to follow and even more difficult to evaluate the administration’s messaging on the conflict. Not to add that for most Americans, Yemen and its issues have again fallen off the map. Yemen’s location south of Saudi Arabia along the Bab al Mandab, a strategic maritime choke point, means the United States has a permanent interest in ensuring that developments within the country do not threaten maritime security or the stability of the Gulf

40-2/3 of the population needs food assistance

David Minden & Laura Good, 3-16, 22, https://madison.com/opinion/column/david-minden-and-laura-good-end-u-s-support-for-war-in-yemen/article_932af4fc-c20e-58f6-91da-6d180db72b51.html, David Minden and Laura Good: End U.S. support for war in Yemen

The war between a Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis in Yemen has caused great civilian suffering since it began eight years ago, with an average of almost 10 raids with hundreds of bombs per day, according to the Yemen Data Project. Furthermore, the Saudis have imposed blockades of ports and airports, keeping food and heating oil out and sellable crude petroleum in. This has caused civilian deprivation and starvation, with more than two-thirds of the entire population of 29 million in need of food assistance, according to the International Federation of Red Cross And Red Crescent Societies.

39-Without US arms Saudi Arabia’s planes couldn’t fly

David Minden & Laura Good, 12-16, 22, https://madison.com/opinion/column/david-minden-and-laura-good-end-u-s-support-for-war-in-yemen/article_932af4fc-c20e-58f6-91da-6d180db72b51.html, David Minden and Laura Good: End U.S. support for war in Yemen

The U.S. supplies Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with weapons, airplanes, fuel, parts and intelligence that have allowed them to conduct the raids and blockades, according to the Council on Foreign Relations. The roots of this war are complicated, but one thing is clear: Without tires and parts from the U.S., the Saudis’ bombers wouldn’t fly.

38-A child dies in Yemen every day

A truce beginning in April should have opened the airports and seaports, but the Saudi-led coalition has allowed only a trickle of ships and planes through. Food, fuel, medicine and clean water are scarce. Eight years of this catastrophic strangling of the goods necessary for life has resulted in tragedy: every 10 minutes on average, a child in Yemen dies from a preventable cause, including starvation, according to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). This year, the World Food Program found 2.2 million children under 5 needed treatment for acute malnutrition. Last year, the U.N. estimated 377,000 died from the war, the majority indirectly from hunger and disease.

37-US pressure on Saudi Arabia will end the war

At this very moment, the U.S can make pivotal moves to stop the killing and starvation. First, political pressure by the U.S. can make a difference in the Saudi-led coalition’s aggression. Saudi air raids have decreased when U.S. public opposition is most vocal, according to reports by the Quincy Institute. Efforts by bipartisan groups in both the U.S. House and Senate to promote a new Yemeni War Powers Act likely encouraged the Saudis to enter the recent truce. So the U.S. ending all support for the war, which is not a threat to our borders, should stop the war, according to experts.

36-Cutting arms sales to Saudi Arabia empowers the Houthis, Saudis want to end the war

Trita Parsi, MSNBC Opinion Columnist, 12-16, 22, https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opinion/yemen-biden-war-powers-resolution-bernie-rcna61893, While MBS undermines America, Joe Biden has his back on Yemen

Few people noticed, but the United States Senate came very close to ending America’s complicity in Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen earlier this week. But the very same person who had vowed to end that war intervened and stopped the Senate from taking action — President Joe Biden. The White House feared that the Senate resolution would have emboldened the Yemeni Houthi movement. But Biden may have instead signaled the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) that, even as he continues to undermine the United States, America still has his back.

The war in Yemen has a special characteristic. Opposition to it is one of the few things that Republicans and Democrats can find some agreement on. At a time when partisanship is at an all-time high, Congress has passed several resolutions calling for an end to America’s support for that war. The last war powers resolution that passed in 2019, which would have forced an end to American military involvement in Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, was vetoed by Donald Trump. All Democrats in the Senate voted for it, as did several Republicans.

It was that same war powers resolution — with some modifications — that Sen. Bernie Sanders of Vermont tried to put to a vote this week. One main difference compared to the 2019 version of the resolution was that “sharing intelligence [with Saudi Arabia] for the purpose of enabling offensive coalition strikes” was now also defined as a form of participation in hostilities…. The White House appears convinced that the Saudis are genuinely seeking an exit from the war and worries, as a result, less about a scenario in which the war is restarted by the Saudi side. I share their assessment that Saudi Arabia currently wants out of the war. But that can change as realities on the ground in Yemen evolve. The point of the resolution is to make sure that the fate of America’s involvement in the war is not determined by the Saudis.

35-Economic collapse and expanding humanitarian crisis in Yemen

Despite the substantial reduction, even the near cessation of military offensives between the Houthi armed group and the Saudi-UAE-led coalition, and especially following the October 2 expiration of a UN-brokered truce, Yemen today is far from peaceful. In fact, a state of “no war, no peace” currently prevails, while the country suffers from an economic collapse and an escalating humanitarian crisis consisting of scant food supplies, health problems, unaddressed trauma, and widespread displacement.

34-Truce doesn’t protect children

DEBBIE MOHNBLATT/THE MEDIA LINE Published: DECEMBER 16, 2022, War in Yemen kills 4 children every day but safety requires more than a truce, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-725093

Yemeni Ambassador Mohamed Qubaty, a former minister who held the tourism and information portfolios in the Yemeni cabinet, told The Media Line, “The overall suffering of the children of Yemen has continued to be the same and never actually changed over time since the beginning of the talks of the so-called truce,” he says. “The people of Yemen need to raise awareness regarding the criminal practices of recruiting children to the war effort, besides debunking all corruption, mismanagement, and inefficiency of the Yemeni government officials and their mishandling of all the international aid received,” Ambassador Mohamed Quabaty Kendall explains that children in Yemen die not only because of violence directly caused by the active war; the danger comes from many different directions. “It’s not just a result of airstrikes, which have subsided in recent months, but starvation, lack of access to clean water, the destruction of health facilities, and the spread of preventable diseases,” she says. “Even during the truce, children continued to be killed by landmines,” she adds. She says that although the truce expired in October, airstrikes have not yet resumed with the previous intensity. However, “children continue to be killed, maimed, exploited, and traumatized by a whole range of ongoing factors, from landmines to diseases and child recruitment,” she says. Qubaty stresses that the Yemeni people must oppose child recruitment. “The people of Yemen need to raise awareness regarding the criminal practices of recruiting children to the war effort, besides debunking all corruption, mismanagement, and inefficiency of the Yemeni government officials and their mishandling of all the international aid received,” he says.

33-Armenia-Azerbaijan tensions increasing

Reuters, 12-16, 22, Tensions flare between Armenia and Azerbaijan over blocked transport route, https://www.euronews.com/2022/12/16/armenia-azerbaijan-lachin-russia

TBILISI –Russia expressed concern on Thursday over escalating tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan as a key road linking Armenia to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave remained blocked for the fourth day. The two countries have fought repeated wars over Nagorno-Karabakh – internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan but home to about 120,000 ethnic Armenians – since the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. As recently as September, more than 200 soldiers were killed in a flare-up of fighting. A group of Azerbaijanis claiming to be environmental activists blocked the Lachin corridor, the only land route for people, goods, food and medical supplies to reach Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia across Azerbaijani territory, at the start of this week. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said on Thursday that the closure of the passage was a “gross violation” of a 2020 peace agreement between Baku and Yerevan and that the population of the enclave had been made into hostages. Armenia says the protesters have been dispatched by the Azerbaijani government in an attempt to block Armenia’s access to the region. Baku rejects those claims, saying the dispute is over illegal Armenian mining in Nagorno-Karabakh. The standoff is a test of Russia’s authority as the main security guarantor in the region at a time when its struggles in the war in Ukraine risk undermining its top-dog status among former Soviet republics in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

32-Need expanded diplomacy; the current truce has failed

AFRAH NASSER, 12-15, 22, Non-resident Fellow, Arab Center, Yemen in Limbo: No War, Yet Still No Peace, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/yemen-in-limbo-no-war-yet-still-no-peace/

The most recent UN-brokered truce expired on October 2 after the Houthis and the IRGY failed to reach an agreement on its renewal. Subsequent peace talks have also stalled. The Houthis continue to launch both conventional and drone attacks against civilian and vital economic targets in Yemen. Occasional fighting also continues between the IRGY’s forces and the UAE-backed STC. Meanwhile, escalating economic warfare between the Houthis and the IRGY is further exacerbating the country’s dire humanitarian situation, and Yemen continues to be ranked as one of the most food-insecure countries in the world.

31-Food insecurity will increase in Yemen

AFRAH NASSER, 12-15, 22, Non-resident Fellow, Arab Center, Yemen in Limbo: No War, Yet Still No Peace, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/yemen-in-limbo-no-war-yet-still-no-peace/

More than half of Yemen’s population of nearly 30 million are expected to experience a high level of food insecurity by the end of the 2022 due to multiple impacts of the conflict, including still-rising levels of internal displacement (with over four million people already internally displaced) and a collapsing economy, and due also to disastrous flooding and other effects of climate change. One key factor, though, has been the impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine on global wheat supplies, including supplies to Yemen, since until recently Russia and Ukraine supplied nearly 45 percent of Yemen’s imported wheat.

30-Attempt to revive Yemen peace agreements in the status quo

AFRAH NASSER, 12-15, 22, Non-resident Fellow, Arab Center, Yemen in Limbo: No War, Yet Still No Peace, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/yemen-in-limbo-no-war-yet-still-no-peace/

As new attempts to revive collapsing peace settlements are coming to the fore, the IRGY’s role in them continues to weaken. An exchange of visits in October between delegations from Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, which occurred without the presence of any IRGY officials, represented an unprecedented step in the course of the conflict, and raised questions about the possibility of Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic acknowledgement of the Houthis as the de facto authority in northern Yemen.

29-Houthis refuse to compromise

AFRAH NASSER, 12-15, 22, Non-resident Fellow, Arab Center, Yemen in Limbo: No War, Yet Still No Peace, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/yemen-in-limbo-no-war-yet-still-no-peace/

The Houthis continue to be one of the truce’s biggest beneficiaries, as most of their conditions have been met, including ending the Saudi-led coalition’s airstrikes and the closure of Sanaa International Airport. However, the group refuses to compromise in return. It remains reluctant to end its siege on Taiz Governorate, which was one of the truce’s terms, and in fact is trying to maximize its gains by setting conditions for peace, such as having the IRGY pay salaries to public sector workers, including Houthi security and military forces. Houthis have long been described by both Yemen experts and international diplomats as spoilers of peace. US Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking, for example, notably stated on December 6 that the Houthis were the ones who are “walking away from peace.”

28-Peace with Houthis mean the Houthis recharge

AFRAH NASSER, 12-15, 22, Non-resident Fellow, Arab Center, Yemen in Limbo: No War, Yet Still No Peace, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/yemen-in-limbo-no-war-yet-still-no-peace/

The cessation of large-scale fighting between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition that opposes it has enabled the group to recharge, reorganize, strengthen its military capacity, and train its fighters. And news reports came out in June revealing that the group is increasingly recruiting children to build up its forces during the truce, despite its pledge to the UN that it would stop the practice. Meanwhile, several separate incidents occurred during the truce wherein marine shipments carrying Iranian weapons bound for the Houthis were confiscated by authorities. In November, the US Navy said that it had seized more than 70 tons of rocket and missile fuel on a ship bound for Yemen, signaling that the Houthis are still continuing to prepare for conflict.News reports came out in June revealing that the Houthis are increasingly recruiting children to build up their forces during the truce, despite their pledge to the UN that they would stop the practice.

27-Azerbaijan cutting gas supplies to the Nagorno-Karabakh region

Simon Maghakyan, 12-15, 2022, Simon Maghakyan is a visiting scholar at Tufts University and a Ph.D. student in Heritage Crime at Cranfield University. He writes and speaks on post-Soviet memory politics and cultural erasure, and facilitates global conversations on protecting Armenian heritage, History Suggests This Winter Could Be Dangerous for Armenians, https://time.com/6241293/armenia-azerbaijan-winter-war/

Wintertime is peace time, or so goes the conventional wisdom in the South Caucasus. This thinking is being challenged this week: On Tuesday, in cold temperatures, Azerbaijan reportedly suspended again the gas supply to Nagorno-Karabakh, a disputed Armenian-populated region, amid an already ongoing blockade. With E.U. monitors set to depart on Sunday the borderlands that Azerbaijan attacked three months ago, the populations of Nagorno-Karabakh and all of Armenia are left pondering the next moves of Azerbaijan’s dynastic president Ilham Aliyev.

26-Growing risk of Azerbaijan-Armenia war

All of this makes this winter an extra dangerous one for Armenians. In addition to this week’s suspension of Nagorno-Karabakh’s gas supply and the ongoing blockade, satellite images suggest a military build-up around Armenia’s internationally recognized borders. Aliyev must know that his opportunities for regional opportunism are shrinking, and would do so even more if his key enabler, Erdogan, loses the election. Despite continuing negotiations, Armenia appears to be expecting a war any moment. But it, and stability-seeking powers, should not let their guard down just because it’s winter. After all, following the late 2020 war, when Erdogan’s and Aliyev’s forces held “the most comprehensive” winter military drill, close to the borders of Armenia, they tested exactly 218 different types of weapons for a reason: to match the artillery count at Sarikamish.

25-Azerbaijan will only agree to peace if it takes over Nagorno-Karabkh

To solidify the narrative that only an Aliyev-led Azerbaijan can be secure and victorious, the senior Aliyev seems bent on delivering a “peace deal” by Jan. 1, in which Armenia would officially consent to Nagorno-Karabakh being part of Azerbaijan and would cede a sovereign corridor, which would accomplish Enver’s Pan-Turkist dream of connecting Turkey and Azerbaijan via uninterrupted land.

24-Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict undermines the delivery of humanitarian aid

MASSIS Post, 12-15, 22, https://massispost.com/2022/12/hearing-on-u-s-policy-towards-caucasus-highlights-armenia-azerbaijan-peace-process/, Hearing on U.S. Policy Towards Caucasus Highlights Armenia & Azerbaijan Peace Process

Rep. Susan Wild (D-PA), emphasized that she has a “significant Armenian American community” in her district, and that many of her constituents are “deeply and personally connected to the continuing conflict.” “Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh continue to face an acute humanitarian crisis, including threats of renewed attacks and chronic shortages of water, energy, healthcare and food,” she noted, to which Secretary Donfried replied that access to Nagorno-Karabakh is limited, “which impacts U.S. ability to engage and undertake in assistance programs.” Despite limitations, however, the “U.S. has sought to help those impacted by the conflict, many of whom are in Armenia.”

23-Cessation in fighting means the Houthis violate rights

AFRAH NASSER, 12-15, 22, Non-resident Fellow, Arab Center, Yemen in Limbo: No War, Yet Still No Peace, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/yemen-in-limbo-no-war-yet-still-no-peace/

The Houthis’ fortified military capacity is evidently fueling their gains, and they clearly have no plans to stop. In addition to carrying out drone attacks on the IRGY’s ports, in December the group threatened any foreign oil and gas companies operating in Yemen if they looted “the wealth of the Yemeni people.”

More tragically, the cessation of large-scale fighting creates a favorable environment for the Houthis to continue waging their parallel war on personal liberties and basic human rights. And indeed, the lull has enabled them to shift their focus toward escalating their political oppression. In November, the group announced a new code of conduct binding all civil servants working in the public sector in Houthi-controlled areas, one that has been met with widespread rejection because of the limits it places on the right to freedom of speech and opinion, and to freedom of mobility. The new code also imposes the group’s sectarian ideas on society. Additional repressive Houthi regulations include restrictions on university professors to prevent them from working in private universities and enforcing the male guardianship rule for women traveling inside the country and abroad. Kendall explains that children in Yemen die not only because of violence directly caused by the active war; the danger comes from many different directions. “It’s not just a result of airstrikes, which have subsided in recent months, but starvation, lack of access to clean water, the destruction of health facilities, and the spread of preventable diseases,” she says. “Even during the truce, children continued to be killed by landmines,” sh

22-Yemenis depend on humanitarian assistance to survive

Hunt, 12-14, 22, Edward Hunt writes about war and empire. He has a PhD in American Studies from the College of William & Mary, FACING HOUTHI VICTORY IN YEMEN, US CHANGES TACTICS, https://fpif.org/facing-houthi-victory-in-yemen-us-changes-tactics/

The Saudi-led coalition’s military intervention sparked a massive humanitarian crisis that continues to this day. The situation in Yemen remains “the largest humanitarian crisis in the world,” according to the United Nations. An estimated 80 percent of the population requires humanitarian assistance just to survive.

21-Yemen war has killed 400,000

At a congressional hearing last week, U.S. officials lamented the current state of affairs in Yemen, as they reviewed the grim consequences of the war.

Sarah Charles, an official at the U.S. Agency for International Development, told Congress that nearly 400,000 people have died in the war, mostly as a result of hunger, sickness, and inadequate health care. “Children are the primary victims of this war,” she said.

20-Truce increases humanitarian assistance

The truce has brought several benefits to the people of Yemen. Since its implementation in April, civilian casualties have sharply declined. More people have received humanitarian assistance. Despite the fact that the truce lapsed in October, several of its main elements remain in place, including a major reduction in hostilities.

19-Stopping arms sales to Saudi Arabia forces a truce

It remains unclear whether the Biden administration has been using the truce to buy time for the Saudi-led coalition or establish a foundation for ending the war. Reportedly, the administration has been reconsidering its ban on sales of offensive weapons to Saudi Arabia. Its sense of betrayal by the Saudi regime over an alleged deal on oil production may stall future cooperation, however.

Congressional opposition to more U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia may tie the administration’s hands. Congress could invoke the War Powers Resolution to end U.S. involvement in the war, leaving the Saudi regime with no option but maintaining the truce and working toward a negotiated settlement.

“As we look forward, we want to get back into the truce,” Lenderking insisted at last week’s hearing. “There are important back-channel conversations that are happening between the parties that are helpful to this process. But… we are not there yet.”

18-Turkey preparing to assault the YPG in Syria

O’Brien, 12-14, 22, Erin O’Brien is a freelance journalist based in Istanbul., Foreign Policy, Will Waging War in Syria Save Erdogan?, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/14/war-syria-turkey-save-erdogan/

In Syria, the United States, Turkey, and even in Russia, fears are mounting that Turkey could launch a full-scale military operation on its embattled neighbor at any moment. On Nov. 27, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar told military commanders on the Iraqi border that Turkey was ready to “complete the tasks” of his government’s operation against the People’s Defense Units (YPG) in Syria, indicating Turkey’s readiness to launch a ground offensive in Syria.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan himself said his forces would “come down hard on the terrorists from land at the most convenient time,” reiterating his conviction to building a “security corridor” in Syria along the Turkish border—something he specifically mentioned in a call with Russian President Vladimir Putin last weekend.

Tensions turned to escalation on Nov. 13 when a bombing on Istanbul’s Istiklal Street, a popular shopping area, killed six people and reportedly injured 81 individuals. The Turkish government blamed the bombing on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militant group and livestreamed the arrest of the Syrian woman responsible for the attack; the PKK, for its part, denied involvement in the bombing. One week later, Turkey launched Operation Claw-Sword, a series of missile attacks on Kurdish bases across northern Syria and Iraq.

17-Israel engaging in strikes in Syria

TIA GOLDENBERG, December 14, 2022, AP News, Israeli military chief suggests Israel behind Syria strike, https://apnews.com/article/iran-israel-syria-3cb2f1119bd6106160905c6a671b57e4

Israel’s military chief of staff strongly suggested on Wednesday that Israel was behind a strike on a truck convoy in Syria last month, giving a rare glimpse of Israel’s shadow war against Iran and its proxies across the region. Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi said Israeli military and intelligence capabilities made it possible to strike specific targets that pose a threat. Without those capabilities, he said, a recent strike would not have been possible. “We could have not known a few weeks ago about the Syrian convoy passing from Iraq to Syria. We could have not known what was in it, and we could have not known that out of 25 trucks, that was the truck. Truck No. 8 is the truck with the weapons,” Kochavi told a conference at a university north of Tel Aviv.

16-Armenia-Azerbaijan tensions increasing, EU monitoring being eliminated

Azetum, 12-13, 22, EU To End Armenia-Azerbaijan Border Monitoring, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32174526.html

The European Union has decided not to extend a two-month monitoring mission launched by it along Armenia’s volatile border with Azerbaijan in October. The decision made by the foreign ministers of EU member states at a meeting in Brussels was announced by Josep Borrell, the EU foreign policy chief, late on Monday. The leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as French President Emmanuel Macron and EU chief Charles Michel reached an agreement on the mission at an October 6 meeting in Prague. It came three weeks after large-scale border clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces left more than 300 soldiers dead. French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna said as recently on December 6 that the 40 or so civilian monitors deployed by the EU to the Armenian side of the border have “really limited the risk of escalation” and should continue their work “as long as it is needed.” However, Borrell made clear that the mission will end as planned on December 19. He gave no reasons for the 27-nation bloc’s decision not to extend it. It is not clear whether the Armenian government requested such an extension. Senior Armenian officials last week praised the monitors but did not clarify whether Yerevan asked the EU to keep them deployed longer than was originally planned. Tensions along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and the “line of contact” in and around Nagorno-Karabakh have remained high since September, with the conflicting sides regularly accusing each other of violating the ceasefire. The monitoring team’s reactions to the truce violations remain unknown.

15-Iranian arms transfers to Armenia increase war risks

Dr. Yasif Huseynov, 12-11, 12, Modern Diplomacy, Armenia and Iran combine forces against Azerbaijan, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/12/11/armenia-and-iran-combine-forces-against-azerbaijan/

In early December, the Azerbaijani media reported about free of charge military supplies of Iran to Armenia amidst the growing tensions between Azerbaijan and Islamic Republic. According to the reports, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) provided 500 units of the Dehlavieh anti-tank missile system and 100 units of Almas system to Armenia at the end of October. These supplies took place amidst the military exercises the Iranian army carried out along the borders with Azerbaijan for the second time since the end of the Second Karabakh War of 2020 – Iran never conducted military drills along the Azerbaijani borders before this war. Along with these, Azerbaijani media published evidence confirming that Iran also sends military personnel to the separatist Armenian forces in the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan that is currently under the temporary control of the Russian peacekeeping units. They are reportedly supposed to train the Armenian separatist forces who regularly carry out terrorist and sabotage attacks against the Azerbaijani army. Although Iran has always, since the post-Soviet independence of Azerbaijan, treated Armenia as an ally against Azerbaijan and even provided military and economic backing to Armenia’s occupation of the Azerbaijani territories in the early 1990s, Baku sought to keep these hostilities down and tried to build good neighborly relations with the Islamic Republic. A number of factors affected this decision of the Azerbaijani government, including the presence of more than 20 million ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran as well as Baku’s efforts to establish friendly relations with the neighboring countries and ensure the Iranian leaders that Azerbaijan did not pose any threat to the Islamic Republic. Towards this end, the Azerbaijani government even quietly reacted to Tehran’s support to the radical religious groups inside Azerbaijan by cracking down only on these groups without challenging the country’s broader relations with Iran. This curtain was lifted between Baku and Tehran following Azerbaijan’s liberation of its occupied territories from the Armenian occupation. Although the Iranian leaders repeatedly relate their “concerns” with Azerbaijan’s alleged plans (in particular, the “Zangazur corridor” transportation route) to cut off Iran-Armenia border by occupying the southern territories of Armenia, these statements do not sound convincing. There are assurances not only by Azerbaijan but also Armenia’s another ally Russia that these transportation routes do not envisage the occupation of anyone’s territories, and they will remain under the sovereignty of the respective transit country. Iran’s aggressive rhetoric and military flexing against Azerbaijan shoot up against the background of Azerbaijan’s decision to open an embassy in Israel and Turkiye’s growing influence in the South Caucasus. In this context, Iran’s narratives resemble those of Russia against Ukraine. In a similar vein, Iranian leaders question Azerbaijan’s independence and its ethnic identity, claiming that Azerbaijan was a historical part of Iran and should return to the Iranian control. One of the latest such claims was made by Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Ali Fadavi, who, in a tweet, reiterated these historical claims against Azerbaijan saying that this country “was separated from Iran due to the incompetence of the Qajar kings”. Attempting to take the advantage of the Shiite believers in Azerbaijan, he openly called for a government change in Baku. “The people of Azerbaijan are Shiite believers who did not lose their original Shiite beliefs under the 70 years of communist pressure. As a rule, there should be a government that pays special attention to this Shiite majority of Azerbaijan”, he added. Thus, Iran, building active cooperation with Armenia in military and economic fields, poses a great threat to the national security of Azerbaijan. In response to these threats, Baku boosts its ties with the major allies of the country, in particular, Turkiye and Israel. Hence, over the last two months, Baku held two major military exercises along the borders with Iran which, according to President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, aimed to “to show that we are not afraid of them”. While the first round of these exercises was held exclusively by the special forces of Azerbaijan in early November, the second round was conducted at much larger scale and together with the Turkish armed forces in early December. These joint exercises included also a response to the most provocative element of the Iranian military drills – employing phantom bridges to cross the river that forms the natural border between Azerbaijan and Iran in most sections of the interstate border. Turkiye’s Defense Minister Hulusi Akar, who joined his Azerbaijani counterpart to supervise the exercises, voiced strong support to Azerbaijan, declaring that any threats or provocations against Turkiye and Azerbaijan is considered as directed against both countries. In parallel to demonstrating military confidence of Azerbaijan in response to the Iranian threats, Baku has also become more outspoken against the repression of the fundamental rights of ethnic Azerbaijanis under the Iranian control. Addressing an international conference in Baku on November 25, President Aliyev criticized the lack of Azerbaijani language schools in Iran while there are those in the languages of other ethnic minorities, vowing that his country will do its best to protect all Azerbaijanis across the world, including those living in Iran. That said, the aggressive rhetoric and expansionist claims of the Iranian leaders dramatically threaten peace and security in the South Caucasus. In this context, Armenia’s alignment with Iran in this power game and the de-facto military alliance they build against Turkiye and Azerbaijan run the risk of triggering a major conflict in the region with catastrophic consequences for the local peoples.

14-Three reasons Houthis oppose a truce

Fatima Abo Alasrar, 12-9, 22, The Houthis’ embargo on Yemen’s oil exports, https://www.mei.edu/publications/houthis-embargo-yemens-oil-exports

The Houthis’ rejection of the truce with the Yemeni government was based on three fundamental factors. The first is the rebels’ inability to fulfill their obligations under the agreement to lift the siege on Taiz because their control over the city keeps pressure on their opponents and gives them increased leverage in any peace negotiations. The second is a lack of interest in the peace process itself as the current status quo gives the Houthis access to Yemeni resources without committing to a power-sharing agreement that could threaten their monopoly over the war-torn country’s northern territory. The third is a desire to return to violence as swiftly as possible because this tactic had proven to give them the upper hand in negotiations in the past. Within 48 hours of the truce’s expiration, the Houthis’ military spokesperson warned Saudi and Emirati oil workers to leave the country while the militant group prepared its attack.

13-China solves the Yemen war

SAEED AL-BATATI, 12-8, 22, China can help bring end to Yemen war, says official, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2213186/middle-east

RIYADH: Yemeni experts and officials have called on China to do more to help bring an end to the country’s civil war by helping peace talks and by increasing economic and humanitarian aid.

“Yemen needs China’s assistance,” Najeeb Ghallab, undersecretary at Yemen’s Information Ministry and a political analyst, told Arab News.

“Achieving peace in Yemen is in China’s interest because it will revitalize Yemen’s ports, which would aid China’s Belt and Road Initiative and open the nation to Chinese businesses.”

His comments come as Rashad Al-Alimi, the leader of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, is traveling to Riyadh to attend an Arab-Chinese summit on Friday.

Ghallab said that can press Iran to cease supplying and funding its proxy militias across the Middle East, including Yemen. “China can persuade Iran to stop supporting its organizations, particularly the Houthis in Yemen,” he said.

The UN Yemen envoy Hans Grundberg’s efforts to end the war have come to a standstill after the Houthis refused to extend a ceasefire that ended in October, and threatened to strike oil infrastructure in regions under government control.

The Houthis have said they would not extend the ceasefire until the government pays public workers in regions the group controls.

12-Truce key to preventing Saudi air strikes

Shelline & Tayyab, 12, 5, 22, Annelle Sheline is a Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Her research focuses on religion and politics in the Middle East; Hassan El-Tayyab is an author, songwriter, and the legislative director for Middle East policy at the Friends Committee on National Legislation., About the Truce in Yemen, https://inkstickmedia.com/what-congress-needs-to-know-about-the-truce-in-yemen/

Because violence has not significantly escalated and specific aspects of the truce remain in place — flights from Sana’a to Amman continue, and ships continue to unload fuel at Hodeidah port — the case of Yemen may appear less urgent. However, without the truce, there is no formal mechanism preventing the Saudis from restarting airstrikes, ending flights, or once again preventing fuel ships from docking at Hodeidah.

11-US using diplomacy to push for peace in Yemen

US Department of State, November 28, 2022, https://www.state.gov/u-s-special-envoy-for-yemen-lenderkings-travel-to-oman-and-saudi-arabia/, U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen Lenderking’s Travel to Oman and Saudi Arabia

U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking started travel on November 27 to Oman and Saudi Arabia to support ongoing peace efforts. The environment created by the UN-mediated truce presents the best opportunity Yemen has had for peace in several years. At this critical moment, we remind the Houthis that Yemenis are calling for peace, not a return to war. To that end, we call on the Houthis to immediately cease their attacks on Yemeni ports, which are disrupting the flow of much-needed resources and exacerbating suffering across Yemen. Such attacks only risk plunging Yemenis into another pointless cycle of violence and suffering. We urge the Houthis to instead seize this opportunity for peace, cooperate with the UN, and accept that the only path forward to ending eight years of destructive war is through a negotiated, inclusive Yemeni-led political settlement.

10-Truce revival key to the delivery of humanitarian aid

National News, 11-28, 22, Return of truce is vital to Yemen as global food and energy crises take toll, https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/2022/11/28/how-the-un-has-deepened-the-yemen-crisis/

Yemen nervously awaits signs that a truce involving all main factions can hold, despite a failure to renew it after the most recent deadline expired. The truce is absolutely vital, not least because the main drivers in Yemen are now shaped by the fallout from the 2018 Stockholm Agreement as well as the global energy and food crisis. Those living in Yemen are left to grapple with a cascading set of dire daily realities. The failure to achieve peace and restore the national government throughout the country is something to be squarely laid at the feet of the UN. The agreement was badly rolled out. One of the pillars of the Stockholm Agreement was the Hodeidah Accord, which opened up the Red Sea port and associated road routes to ensure that food and other flows could increase to ease the threat of famine. Last week, Anis Al Sharafi of the Aden-based Southern Transition Council (STC), which is a partner with the national government, set out how what looked like a viable solution was, in fact, twisted by the implementation. By overriding the safeguards on how trade and revenues are freed up, Houthi commanders and checkpoints were granted a gatekeeper. The consequences have been downplayed. The outcome is an escalatory cycle, according to Mr Sharafi, that has granted the Houthi leadership “infinite” military and political capacity. With its new space within the context of conflict, the Houthi leadership has taken the opportunity for a stand that is stubborn and prolonging. “Maybe on the surface it looks like you might have a variable solution, but typically giving [the advantage] to one side causes the problem to become more complicated,” he said in Aden. The failure to achieve peace is something to be squarely laid at the feet of the UN Rising oil prices have given the Houthi leadership and its backers in Iran more cause to block an overarching solution in Yemen. As another Yemeni last week observed, the seas around the country’s coast are the main route for energy exportation to Europe and the Houthis are trying to take advantage of this vantage point. Escalation along that route is obviously something that European countries are very alert to, and the regimes hostile to the West are just as alert to the advantages of disruption of those corridors. Iranian efforts to have another coast to launch attacks on the tanker lanes to Europe are holding Yemen hostage. This, for the Iranian leadership, is a potential pinch point that would allow Tehran to exercise pressure through escalation. At a time when Iran’s internal dynamic is one of siege by the opposition demonstrations, this gives Tehran an external card to play to ensure that the international community does not support the regime’s opponents. For the wartime administration in Yemen, this is a dire squeeze. This is particularly as the people who have fle the oppressive situation in Sanaa or the hardships across the frontlines wait fora return to their properties or towns in dire straits. “On top of our own population, we have more than 3 million refugees from the north and we have more than a million that have come from Africa,” said the STC representative. “Although there is pressure on our resources, the aid that is given by the international community is given to refugees. Whereas our own people who are suffering from this extra pressure are not getting anything.”

9-US needs to diplomatically reengage in the Middle East, especially in Syria, where the US needs to be engaged to stop Turkish aggression

Yanis E. Makhlouf, 8-13, 22, The Diplomatic Retreat of the US in the Middle East, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2022/08/13/the-diplomatic-retreat-of-the-us-in-the-middle-east/

To fill the void, regional powers like Turkey are stepping up their diplomatic efforts, especially in light of the war in Ukraine. Similarly, the US seems increasingly set aside the Syrian situation. Bashar Al-Assad’s visit to the UAE a few months ago, the first to any Arab state since the start of the Syrian civil war was a major development from which the US seemed rather absent apart from some diplomatic objections towards its Emirati ally.

The dynamics of the region have changed greatly in the past twenty years and though America’s presence especially militarily has been considerably reduced, American leadership is still needed. The War in Syria is a case in point with the question of America’s support for the Kurds in the northeast of the country. Leaving the issue unresolved and the Kurds to their fate do not seem like a good solution. It could incite Turkey to engage in further advances in the Syrian north, which in turn, could stoke great tensions with the Al-Assad clan, the Russians and Iranians.

It is time for the current administration to recognise that it has a Middle East problem and address the failures of its foreign policy. Not doing so could leave a dangerous opening to other powers like China or Russia that will do their utmost to court America’s Middle Eastern partners to gain their good graces and snatch them away from the US’ sphere of influence.

8-US leadership in the Middle East needed to prevent a rise in China’s influence

Yanis E. Makhlouf, 8-13, 22, The Diplomatic Retreat of the US in the Middle East, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2022/08/13/the-diplomatic-retreat-of-the-us-in-the-middle-east/

The dynamics of the region have changed greatly in the past twenty years and though America’s presence especially militarily has been considerably reduced, American leadership is still needed. The War in Syria is a case in point with the question of America’s support for the Kurds in the northeast of the country. Leaving the issue unresolved and the Kurds to their fate do not seem like a good solution. It could incite Turkey to engage in further advances in the Syrian north, which in turn, could stoke great tensions with the Al-Assad clan, the Russians and Iranians.

7-Understanding the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflictRadio Free Liberty, 8-9, 22, Turkey Warns Armenia Against ‘New Provocations’ Over Nagorno-Karabakh, https://www.rferl.org/a/turkey-warns-armenia-provocations-nagorno-karabakh/31979795.html

Azerbaijan and Armenia have been locked in a conflict over Azerbaijan’s breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh for years. Nagorno-Karabakh, which had been populated mainly by ethnic Armenians, declared independence from Azerbaijan amid a 1988-94 war that claimed an estimated 30,000 lives and displaced hundreds of thousands of people. Internationally mediated negotiations with the involvement of the OSCE’s so-called Minsk Group — co-chaired by France, Russia, and the United States — failed to result in a resolution before war broke out again in September 2020. In the aftermath of the war that killed more than 6,500 people, Armenia agreed to hand over three districts ringing Nagorno-Karabakh that had been under Armenian control since the 1990s, including the Lachin corridor, and Russia deployed some 2,000 peacekeepers to oversee the truce.

6-Reducing Middle East diplomacy increases war risks that suck in the US military and divert resources from Asia

Brandon Morgan June 7, 2022, The Imperative of Middle East Regional Order and U.S. Diplomacy, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2022/6/7/the-imperative-of-middle-east-regional-order-and-us-diplomacy

Indeed, U.S. ambivalence towards recent Iran-backed Houthi strikes against Saudi and Emirate oil facilities suggest that Washington is ready to accept broader strategic disengagement from the region, come what may. But strategic disengagement from the Middle East to focus on China and a war-bound Russia will likely come at high cost for Washington. Indeed, without a U.S.-supported Middle East security architecture, the long simmering tensions could erupt into a firestorm of region wide conflict inevitably requiring American military intervention to prevent an oil crisis or renewal of transnational terrorism. This would completely undermine Washington’s desire to pivot strategic focus towards the Indo-Pacific. But insuring against negative outcomes in the Middle East—the region of traditional U.S. focus—also provides the opportunity for the rise of positive outcomes in economic growth and institutional development. This would not only provide positive trade benefits for the U.S., but it would also promote an American friendly regional order while limiting the growing influence of China and Russia. Fortunately, the tools to prevent strategic crises and promote Middle East regional growth lie increasingly less in military capacity and more in the realm of diplomatic and economic engagement. This excess of military capacity in the Middle East could prove highly valuable in the Indo-Pacific and Eastern Europe.

Establishing a Middle Eastern security architecture centered on a balance of power is crucial to American interests in ensuring uninhibited movement of global trade and energy resources. Importanly, the relationship between Iran and the Arab-Israeli coalition is central to ensuring this regional order and stability. But the current American strategy of diplomatic disengagement coupled with unabated conventional arms buildup of Gulf Arab partners only serves to exacerbate regional tensions.

5-Diplomacy will reduce the Iran threat over the long-term

Brandon Morgan June 7, 2022, The Imperative of Middle East Regional Order and U.S. Diplomacy, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2022/6/7/the-imperative-of-middle-east-regional-order-and-us-diplomacy

Indeed, Iran’s economy grew by 13.4% in 2016—all before full sanctions relief implementation, strongly suggesting that Iran stands to benefit from a renewed deal.[11] But it is important to remember that although Iran has long maintained its asymmetric and ballistic missile capabilities, the scale and severity of attacks against strategic oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., and Persian Gulf came after U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018. This suggests that while Tehran is not likely to surrender the Revolutionary Guard and proxy-force funding in the short term, it is possible for the U.S. to establish a security dialogue that minimizes regional tensions and builds momentum for further diplomatic victories in the long term.

A regional security architecture in the Middle East must be founded on reassurance to Arab-Israeli partners, continued deterrence against Iran, and good faith negotiations. The U.S. should revitalize its diplomatic engagement with Arab-Israeli partners. Importantly, this requires astute diplomacy that recognizes that a general pivot to other regions does not equate to complete strategic disengagement from the Middle East. The U.S. should reassure its Arab-Israeli partners that the American government will diplomatically support the coalition against attacks by Iran while offering economic assistance in the aftermath of Iranian strike

4-Effective Middle East diplomacy needed to free-up resources to complete the Asian military pivot

Brandon Morgan June 7, 2022, The Imperative of Middle East Regional Order and U.S. Diplomacy, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2022/6/7/the-imperative-of-middle-east-regional-order-and-us-diplomacy

While such a regional order may seem far-fetched, the U.S. government would at least benefit significantly from renewing its geostrategic appreciation of the Middle East. Importantly, this focus should rely on diplomacy and economics as the primary instruments to achieve a stable balance of power and regional order. The likely alternative of escalating tensions, expanded conflict, and abdicating American regional influence to strategic competitors would only serve to further erode U.S. geopolitical strength in the Middle East and beyond. Furthermore, Washington will have to undertake a concerted effort to renew progress towards a Palestinian-Israeli resolution to achieve broader regional stability. The U.S. will also have to consider the implications of recognizing disputed territory—such as the Western Sahara as part of Morocco, and the Golan Heights as part of Israel—with America’s assertion that military force should not be used to rewrite borders, as in Russia’s occupation of Crimea. A physical equilibrium must match its moral counterpart. As Henry Kissinger remarked in Diplomacy, a regional balance of power “reduces the opportunities for using force” while “a shared sense of justice reduces the desire to use force.”[15] Indeed, if there is any hope to complete the Indo-Pacific military pivot, the U.S. must commit to restore world class diplomacy in the Middle East.

3-US should expand the use of diplomacy in the Middle East to resolve conflicts

Tamara Cofman Wittes, Former Brookings Expert, 2021, What to do – and what not to do – in the Middle East, https://www.brookings.edu/research/what-to-do-and-what-not-to-do-in-the-middle-east/

For over a decade, the United States has sought to wind down the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military footprint in the Middle East, and redirect scarce resources to Asia. Global and regional trends reinforced this American desire to reduce the priority of the Middle East in its global strategy, and the military “pivot” is well underway. The challenge for American policy is how to protect its remaining and still important interests in that region in an era of austerity and fierce power competition, both in the region and globally. The incoming Biden administration should not waste the window for a reset.

Gulf Arab partners, facing fiscal constraints from lower energy prices and the COVID-19-induced global recession, are more open to conflict resolution in the proxy wars they hagve been fighting across the region. But their relative penury will also impede their ability to invest in stabilizing weaker neighbors, including key states like Jordan and Egypt. Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic of Iran is sanctioned to the hilt, and used to wielding regional influence on the cheap. Thus the balance of power in the region may even favor the Iranians as the pandemic begins to recede. The Biden team must set aside the Trump administration’s fruitless “maximum pressure” in favor of the mix of intelligence cooperation, diplomacy, financial and military tools that can effectively deter or disrupt subversive Iranian activity while incentivizing Tehran’s return to the nuclear negotiating table.

And the Pentagon must undertake a zero-based review of its force presence in the Persian Gulf region to ensure it is both efficient and effective in fulfilling its core missions there.

The United States must rebuild what has historically been its most effective tool in the Middle East: diplomacy, especially in advancing conflict resolution. In Yemen and Libya, there might now be opportunities to pull competing regional powers out of the fighting and negotiate power-sharing governments that promote stability and reduce freedom of action for Islamist terrorist movements. Washington cannot let Israelis and Palestinians stew in their stalemated conflict — but rather than trying to reconvene talks, it should take a long-term approach to rebuilding foundations for compromise between the two societies while insisting that they both abjure destabilizing unilateral actions, and work to improve freedom, security, and prosperity for those living with the conflict every day…. As the United States works to reduce the heavy military focus of its regional policy, it needs to beef up its diplomacy to tamp down other regional conflicts that give troublemakers like Iran and Russia opportunities to grow their influence.

2-US diplomacy can resolve the Yemen conflict

Tamara Cofman Wittes, Former Brookings Expert, 2021, What to do – and what not to do – in the Middle East, https://www.brookings.edu/research/what-to-do-and-what-not-to-do-in-the-middle-east/

The Yemen conflict offers the most opportunities for the United States to encourage a path toward conflict resolution. Both the Saudi and Emirati leaderships have begun to recognize that the price they are paying for their involvement in the conflict has grown higher and unsustainable. They have not only failed to achieve their goals, they have also profoundly undermined Yemeni and regional stability, to the benefit of Iran and al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.

1-Diplomacy will get other actors to reduce their support of the Yemen war

Tamara Cofman Wittes, Former Brookings Expert, 2021, What to do – and what not to do – in the Middle East, https://www.brookings.edu/research/what-to-do-and-what-not-to-do-in-the-middle-east/

The Houthis might take egregious actions to capture Saudi territory, attack Saudi infrastructure, or cause significant Saudi casualties. But barring such escalation, the United States can helpfully expend some diplomatic energy by encouraging external actors to reduce their involvement in the war, support the negotiations process under U.N. auspices, and by discouraging unhelpful actions by its regional partners. Such an effort is vastly complicated by the reckless decision of the Trump administration in January 2021 to designate the Houthi movement as a foreign terrorist organization.