This contention says that breaking up Big Tech will cause a resource trade-off within the Department of Justice (DOJ) that will undermine its ability to combat terrorism.
Break-ups cause DOJ enforcement trade-offs
MARGARET HARDING MCGILL and STEVEN OVERLY 05/27/2019, Politico, Why breaking up Facebook won’t be easy, MARGARET HARDING MCGILL and STEVEN OVERLY 05/27/2019, Politico, Why breaking up Facebook won’t be easy, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/27/breaking-up-facebook-antittrust-1446087
Antitrust cases take time and money The Justice Department’s antitrust lawsuit against AT&T, and its unsuccessful battle to break up Microsoft, were yearslong affairs that started under one presidential administration and ended in another. That means whoever wins the White House in 2020 could well be out of office before a potential case against Facebook is decided or settled. The AT&T case began in 1974 and ended in 1982, after which the government spent another two years implementing an agreement that split up the company into eight smaller entities. The government spent another decade in the 1990s and early 2000s waging an antitrust war against Microsoft for anti-competitive behavior, arguing that its operating system and internet browser should be separated. But by the time the court approved a settlement in 2002, requiring changes to the company’s business practices but leaving Microsoft intact, the penalties did not have much impact, Verveer said. “Technology will change, business models will change, consumer preferences will change,” he said. “You could end up at the end of a long process with something that frankly doesn’t make very much difference because the world has moved on.” That’s one reason some Facebook critics, including former DOJ antitrust official Gene Kimmelman, argue that imposing restrictions on how social media companies use data could be a more effective strategy than breaking them up. A lengthy lawsuit against Facebook would also consume a lot of resources at the DOJ, which might have to hire outside attorneys and other experts as it did in the Microsoft case. The expense could even require additional appropriations from Congress, Schwartzman said. “It is a really daunting enterprise,” Schwartzman said. “The likelihood the Justice Department or Federal Trade Commission would be able to undertake such an activity is remote.”
DOJ resources are limited
Matt Kelly, November 29, 2018, http://www.radicalcompliance.com/2018/11/29/mdoj-new-cooperation-policy/, More DOJ! New Cooperation Policy
The truth, of course, lies somewhere between those two points. The Justice Department does have limited resources; corporations scrounging up every bit of information on every participant in a wrongdoing scheme does waste resources, since many of those participants won’t be prosecuted. To that extent, Rosenstein is correct.
DOJ critical to counterterrorism investigations and stopping terrorism
David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the U.S. Department of Justice, 2from March 2009 to March 2011., 2011, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/01_David-Kris.pdf
Law enforcement helps us win this war. And I want to make clear, for the limited purpose of this article and in light of the nature of our current national debate, that this is not primarily a values-based argument. That is, I am not saying law enforcement helps us win in the sense that it is a shining city on a hill that captures hearts and minds around the world (although I do think our criminal justice system is widely respected). Values are critically important, both intrinsically and in terms of their effect on us, our allies, and our adversaries – and I will have more to say about values later45 – but right now, in part because of the nature of our national debate on this topic, I am talking about something more direct and concrete. When I say that law enforcement helps us win this war, I mean that it helps us disrupt, defeat, dismantle, and destroy our adversaries (without destroying us or our way of life in the process). In particular, law enforcement helps us in at least three ways – it disrupts terrorist plots through arrests, incapacitates terrorists through incarceration after prosecution, and it can be used to obtain intelligence from terrorists or their supporters through interrogation, and through recruiting them as cooperating assets.46 Some of the evidence for that conclusion is set out below. A. Disruption, Incapacitation, Intelligence CollectionSince 9/11, the DOJ has convicted hundreds of defendants as a result of terrorism-related investigations. Some of these convictions have involved per se terrorism offenses,47 while others have not.48 Many of the terrorism convictions obtained in federal court both before and after 9/11 have resulted in long sentences, including the convictions of the first World Trade Center bomber, Ramzi Yousef, and the East Africa Embassy bombers, Richard Reid, Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, Masaud Khan, Zacarias Moussaoui, and Oussama Kassir, all of whom are now serving life sentences in federal prison. Today, law enforcement efforts against terrorism continue. In 2009, as outside observers have remarked, the DOJ charged more individuals with significant terrorism-related offenses than in any year since 9/11.49 That trend continued in 2010. Here are a few examples of recent terrorism charges or convictions: In June and August 2009, Syed Ahmed Harris and Ehsanul Islam Sadequee were each convicted in the Northern District of Georgia for providing material support to al Qaeda, including videotaping potential U.S. targets. They were sentenced to 13 and 17 years in prison, respectively. In September 2009, Michael C. Finton was arrested and charged with terrorism offenses after he attempted to detonate an explosive device outside a federal building in Springfield, Illinois. That same month, Hosam Maher Husein Smadi was arrested and charged with attempting to detonate an explosive device outside an office building in Dallas, Texas. Smadi pleaded guilty in May 2010 to attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction, and he was sentenced in October 2010 to 24 years in prison. Finton is awaiting trial. Also in September 2009, Najibullah Zazi was arrested just before carrying out a very serious plot to bomb the New York subway system; he pleaded guilty in February 2010 and is awaiting sentencing in the Eastern District of New York. In October and December 2009, David Coleman Headley and Tahawwur Hussain Rana were charged in the Northern District of Illinois with conspiracy to attack a Dutch cartoonist overseas, and with assisting the terror attack in Mumbai, India that killed 164 people. Headley pleaded guilty in March 2010 to a dozen federal terrorism charges, admitting that he participated in planning both attacks, and he is awaiting sentencing; Rana is awaiting trial. In May 2010, Faisal Shahzad was arrested in the Southern District of New York in connection with an attempted car bombing in Times Square; he pleaded guilty in June 2010 to all counts of the 10-count indictment against him, including conspiring and attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction, conspiring and attempting to commit an act of terrorism transcending national boundaries, attempting to use a destructive device during and in relation to a conspiracy to commit an act of terrorism… Alternatively, there are cases in which a seemingly small fish may in fact be a big one, yet it may not be feasible either to prove that he is, or to establish an alternative basis for detaining him, even under the law of war. These cases pose the traditional tension between the intelligence benefit of continued surveillance and the risk to public safety from leaving a suspected terrorist at large (in other words, a tension between the values of short-term disruption and long-term incapacitation). In some of these cases, the risk-benefit equation will demand immediate action, disrupting a terrorist plot through arrest and prosecution for whatever criminal conduct can be established. Sometimes, a sentence of even a few months or years can shatter a terrorist cell and cripple its operational ability. Finally, of course, disruptive arrests may also generate valuable intelligence. Some small fish may be ripe for recruitment precisely because they are not fully radicalized. Such persons may be persuaded to cooperate, either before or after they are released. Moreover, arrests and other disruptive efforts may provoke statements or actions from others that provide an understanding of a terrorist network – such cases effectively “shake the tree” and show how suspects still at large respond to the arrest. Since 2001, in fact, the criminal justice system has collected valuable intelligence about a host of terrorist activities. In effect, it has worked as what the Intelligence Community would call a HUMINT collection platform.54 I will first explain how the system works as an intelligence collection platform – beginning with pre-arrest activity and ending with sentencing and beyond – and then turn to a few illustrative examples…. Arrest. An arrest provides the next opportunity to gain intelligence from a target. At the time of arrest inside the United States, the FBI’s longstanding and publicly known policy, reaffirmed most recently in 2008,56 is generally to advise a target of his rights under Miranda prior to custodial interrogation except to the extent that the public-safety exception applies.57
If we don’t catch them terrorists could use nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
Krstic 17. (Marko M. Krstic, Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. Published in the Military Techinical Courier–Vol 65, Issue 2–a multidisciplinary scientific journal of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia. TENDENCY OF USING CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES. 2017. scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0042-8469/2017/0042-84691702481K.pdf) **CBRN = Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
The studies of a few cases of earlier CBRN actions have led experts to identify the key characteristics of terrorist groups that could potentially have an interest to use these weapons. It is thought that conservatism is inherent in terrorist organizations, but it must not be forgotten that some terrorists are inclined to innovations in weapons and tactics, as well as to taking risks in actions or in the choice of weapons. Many experts agree that most terrorist organizations want to use proven methods to achieve desired effects. Innovations, especially in the field of CBRN weapons, often indicate terrorists are likely to be led by other factors rather than by pure curiosity and desire to experiment. For some individuals, repression and democratic and strong rule of law are positive determinants of the emergence of CBRN actions which points to a new and more complex global security environment with an increasing risk of terrorists trying to perform a CBRN attack. It is a frightening fact that a single terrorist or isolated terrorist group could improvise a biological weapon or use other ways to spread anthrax, smallpox or other biological agents and thereby cause mass casualties and destroy the health care system of a state. CBRN weapons are secretly shipped to terrorists or hostile governments and represent a significant and growing threat to many countries. Although the threat of CBRN attacks is widely recognized as the central issue of national security, most analysts assume that the primary danger is a threat of the military use of these weapons in conventional wars with tra-ditional military means while the threat of covert attacks, which include terrorism, is rashly and unfairly neglected. Covert attacks are difficult to deter or prevent and CBRN weapons suitable for this type of attack are available to a growing number of enemy states and groups. At the same time, restrictions on their use appear to be diminishing, and so-called new terrorists do not always escalate and become apparent only by using unconventional weapons. These weapons are easily spread or transmitted from person to person, have a high mortality rate and a potential impact on public health, causing mass casualties that can crush health systems and cause public panic and social disruption, thus requiring special efforts to suppress them. When assessing the threat of CBRN weapons, we should take into account the change in capacity to carry out terrorist attacks that are on the rise among countries and non-government elements. Analysts believe that the fear of chemical and biological terrorist attacks is excessive, they point out that, in the past, very few attacks involved these weapons, and even those few attempts that have occurred were mostly thwarted by the authorities. A relative ease with which biological weapons can be obtained, along with other current changes and turbulences in the world, sets the stage for another type of warfare in the 21st century. The potential for CBRN terrorism has widely grown since 11 September, when some of these materials were used. The danger of terrorist use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction represents a very serious threat for many countries; if a terrorist group could gain access to this weapon, it is highly likely it would use it, or threaten to use it. Although there is very little information on terrorists and their ability to come into possession of nuclear weapons or on their intentions to get them, the risk of CBRN weapons has certainly increased since the terrorists started to become more familiar with these agents and their harmful consequences. Discovering the nature of the threat of biological weapons, as well as the appropriate response to them requires an emphasis on the biological characteristics of these instruments of war and terror. Preparing for a terrorist attack may seem daunting and there are a small number of people with practical experience and a good knowledge of CBRN weapons, because until recently there was no need to own them. In the past, most of the planning regarding emergency response to terrorism concentrated on the concerns of open attacks (bombing). However, the threats of CBRN weapons are taken seriously, especially in the USA, where media, fascinated by new weapons of mass destruction, encourage a growing fear for public safety. Terrorists who have significant human and material resources are much more likely to realize their intentions than lone perpetrators or small terrorist groups. A CBRN terrorism threat is certainly a matter of concern; however, terrorists will face many obstacles in the implementation of an attack of this kind. This includes the acquisition of materials and preparation for spreading them as well as a selection and a survey of a chosen objective and a correct dose required to achieve a desired effect. The growing threat of CBRN terrorism Terrorism can be defined as a deliberate act of violence intended to cause damage, but also to create an appropriate political and ideological situation, so that the use of these non-traditional weapons of terror outside the context is obvious, and the goals will not be military, but civilian ones (Bioterrorism, chemical weapons, and radiation terrorism, nd). Toxic substances, regardless of whether they are of animal, vegetable or mineral origin, were used throughout the history for political assassinations and sabotage; despite the risk of severe penalties, the prospects for success favoured the use of toxic substances. Such use has always been reduced, however, since only a small number of people had access to substances and possessed the ability of learn how to use them (Pascal, 1999). CBRN weapons are rightly viewed with a special sense of horror, their effects can be devastating and indiscriminating, and they take the most stringent toll among the most vulnerable population, non-combatants (e.g. a biological attack cannot be detected sufficiently fast after the disease spreads through the population). Moreover, chemical and biological weapons are a particularly attractive alternative for groups that do not have the ability to produce nuclear weapons, and this risk raises complex but important ethical issues (London, 2003). The common name for CBRN terrorism which causes the death of a large number of people, large scale damage and a strong echo worldwide is post-industrial or hyper-terrorism. This means that non-state elements possess and dispose of assets that were previously held only by states, but unlike them, which often fear reprisals after WMD attacks, terrorists, having no geographical location, are ready to use WMD with much less scrupulousness and fear (Kurmnik, Ribnikar, 2003). Some authors have described the factors that make chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorist attacks in many ways unique and demanding, such as an element of surprise, invisible agents, ordnance, the risk of repetition and new types of risks (Ruggiero, Voss, 2015). In the past 30 years, the use of CBRN weapons has become a major concern for many nations around the world. The public has become insensitive to traditional terrorist attacks that seem to be a less efficient way for terrorist organizations to achieve their goals. What causes shock and fear is actually presenting the properties of weapons which can be used by terrorist organizations to enhance their efforts and the effectiveness of attacks. CBRN terrorism is often a synonym for weapons of mass destruction, although this form of terrorism and related incidents do not require attacks and inflicting harm to large numbers of people – they do not even require deadly attacks at all. The number of studies on this type of terrorism is limited due to the lack of available data on
this terrorism type. There is a very small number of databases of CBRN incidents, and even the existing ones have relatively little to do with them and they are compared to conventional terrorism (Jesse, 2012). Some experts emphasize the factors that promote such attacks and these factors include the availability of information and expertise, increased frustration of terrorists, demonization of the target population, as well as a millennial, apocalyptic or messianic vision. Experts also differ in opinion when it comes to possible perpetrators of CBRN incidents, and include religious fundamentalists and cults1 as possible perpetrators of such attacks, especially when these groups address to ethereal audience, emphasizing the hatred of unbelievers (Ivanova, Sandler, 2007). Concerns about super terrorism which involves the use of CBRN weapons are mainly focused on what terrorists can do in the context of our social reality, with an emphasis on terrorist motivations, initiatives and limitations. When considering which terrorist groups may be inclined to commit CBRN terrorism, it is important to recognize the spectrum of these acts, as well as to analyze the following categorization: (a) massive casualty events produced by conventional weapons; (b) CBRN scams; (c) conventional attack on a nuclear facility; (d) limited-scale chemical or biological attack or a radiological dispersion; (e) large scale chemical or biological attack or a radiological dispersion; and (f) CBRN strikes (super terrorism) that can lead to thousands of victims. In addition to the motivation and willingness to inflict mass casualties in any way, terrorists must have technical and financial capabilities to come into possession of material and acquire skills for these types of weapons and materials and carry out a successful attack. Chemical and biological weapons can pose a risk to terrorists thus deterring them from using such weapons (Post, 2005, pp.148-151). The possibility that terrorists use chemical or biological substances may increase over the next decade, according to US intelligence agencies. According to CIA2 , an interest among non-state actors, including terrorists, for biological and chemical materials is real and growing, and the number of potential perpetrators is increasing. The agency also noted that many of these groups had developed an international network and did not need to rely on state sponsors for financial and technical support. However, it is believed that it is less likely that terrorists would choose chemical and biological weapons over conventional explosives, because these weapons are difficult to control and their results are unpredictable (Condesman, Burke, 2001). The risk of CBRN weapons is growing since terrorists are better acquainted with these agents and their potential for causing harm3 . These agents possess desirable characteristics as weapons of terror; they are biologically invisible to the naked eye, odorless and potentially lethal in the form of particles; natural organisms are so readily available, and can be “camouflaged” in natural disasters and used to spread fear and various diseases. Chemical agents quickly attack the critical physiological centers of the body, disabling or killing the victim. Biological and chemical weapons require the application of huge amounts of resources and result in different effects, causing fear and panic in the contaminated areas. Often referred to as “weapons of mass destruction”, but, in medical terms, they are weapons of potential mass casualties because they can lead to massive death toll in the absence of preventive measures and timely response (Meyer, Spinella, 2014, pp.645-656). “Bioterrorism is the intentional use of microorganisms or toxins derived from living organisms used for hostile purposes intended to cause disease or death in man, animals and plants, on which they depend”. The threat of bioterrorist attacks is real, and each individual is a potential terrorist, when terrorists are “invisible” prior to an attack which also can be “invisible” in the form of causing infectious disea-ses or epidemics. Citizens who are not aware they are infected are potential safety hazard and so-called dangerous bodies (Mijalković, 2011). In the last ten years, the issue of CBRN weapons has attracted the attention of experts, but a list of priorities by the heads of states has never been established. Biological weapons almost became forgotten after they had been banned by the 1972 Convention on Biological Weapons. A significant attention was paid to them during the 90s of the last century. The important thing is that biological weapons attract much less attention than other similar weapons, but probably represent the greatest danger, and in addition to their use in war, they are available as instruments of terror in peace. Some countries showed willingness to use such weapons against defenseless populations to achieve strategic objectives, and in this regard, some analysts believe that those who attacked the World Trade Center in 1993 applied cyanide on their bombs (this was not confirmed, but a large amount of cyanide was found in possession of the perpetrators). Such a group will prove to be less inefficient, because if terrorists decide to shock and surprise the government by inflicting enormous damage, CBRN weapons will become more attractive and more accessible (Bettis, 1998). Motives and forms of behavior of individuals and groups who acquired or used CBRN weapons have existed since long ago and there is no doubt that modern society is vulnerable to such attacks (Tucker, 2000). Fear of biological terrorism is certainly greater than the fear of the conventional forms of terrorism; some of these fears are justified and some are often exaggerated. Some agents are really very contagious and deadly, and if used properly, have a potential to result in casualties similar to those in a nuclear attack. Perhaps the scariest aspect of biological weapons is that the body is attacked without warning, people are afraid of the threat as it is invisible, and cannot be heard or felt. The history of warfare, terrorism and crime involving biological agents in the last century is considerably less dangerous and more deadly than the history of conventional warfare (Parachini, 2001). Today, some states and some terrorist groups can more easily overcome technological barriers due to the increased flow of information and access to previously unavailable technologies. Along with nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons are part of an unholy trinity of weapons of mass destruction (Davis, Johnson-Winegar, 2000, pp.15-28). The society is now faced with the threat of an apocalyptic and asymmetric war scenario in which kamikaze attackers are able to arm themselves with WMD4 with